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Abstract 
In the 21st century, firms aim to meet consumer preferences in an absurdly rapid manner with 
new technological products and solutions. Innovation from R&D investments has become 
increasingly important to meeting this demand. Furthermore, as more firms become 
technology-minded, intangible assets constitute growing parts of their total assets. In this thesis, 
we analyse the effect of these increasingly important factors (i.e., R&D intensity and intangible 
assets) on capital structure for the IT services industry.  
 
In addition to analysing intangible assets and the R&D intensity effect, we also investigate the 
impact of macroeconomic factors on capital structure. We include commonly known 
determinants of capital structure as control variables in a panel data regression to a sample of 
808 globally listed IT services firms. Country-specific R&D tax subsidy rates work as a natural 
experiment, and we utilize this in a two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimation to establish a 
causal relationship between R&D intensity and debt and equity issuance. The results are 
analysed in light of theories and empirical studies related to capital structure.  
 
Our findings suggest that IT services firms tend to have lower leverage ratios than other 
industrial companies from G7 countries, and that the standard determinants of capital structure 
have the same effect on leverage that previous studies have indicated. By including 
macroeconomic factors, we observe a countercyclical debt ratio among IT services firms. 
Regarding intangible assets, we find a positive relationship to leverage ratio, debt and equity. 
This relationship implies that creditors view such assets as collateral, thus supporting a higher 
leverage ratio. We document that firms with high R&D intensity tend to issue more equity and 
less debt, thereby lowering their overall leverage ratio. However, the results are not robust for 
firm-fixed effects, and we cannot fully conclude that R&D intensity and intangible assets effect 
debt or if they are part of determining the capital structure of listed IT services firms.  
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1. Introduction 
Intangible assets are a significant and growing part of a firm’s total assets. Research has 
established that tangible assets are one of the main determinants of leverage, as they can be 
used as collateral. Compared to tangible assets, the literature regarding the effect of intangible 
assets is more limited. It is not clear what companies with a substantial proportion of intangible 
assets to tangible assets have to bargain with when obtaining loans. There is no doubt about the 
importance of innovation on economic growth, but the fact that most Western countries 
subsidize research and development (R&D) investments substantiates the idea that firms do not 
invest enough in R&D and innovation. We will investigate whether firms with higher R&D 
expenditures obtain less external funding, which might reduce the possibility to pursue 
innovative investments. Thus, we will analyse determinants for leverage and focus on the 
relationships between leverage, intangible assets and R&D intensity.  
We analyse this relationship using a sample of 808 firms from the information technology (IT) 
services industry from 2006 to 2018. Sorting industries after leverage, the IT services industry 
is in the low-end. On the other hand, companies which operate in the IT services industry are 
ranked high with respect to R&D expenses and intangible assets. This makes the IT services 
industry an ideal industry to analyse if we are to develop a greater understanding of the 
aforementioned relationships. Using comprehensive statistical analyses with data sourced from 
global databases, we will discuss connections between company-specific and macroeconomic 
factors on capital structure. 
 
The IT industry has seen substantial change since the 1960s and 70s, when it was limited to the 
banking sector, mathematical engineers and computer scientists. Now IT is the backbone of 
most modern companies, and if the IT system is not up to date, the organization’s efficiency is 
weakened. The industry and the competition have grown massively over the last three decades. 
In an environment with tight margins, choosing the correct capital structure could be crucial to 
success. IT services depend on making investments in R&D to capture market share (Harvin et 
al., 2014). These investments could be made by acquiring debt, but having too much debt can 
reduce a company’s flexibility to make value-creating investments, thereby lowering future 
profit.  
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Financing is the process of providing funds for business activities, investing and making 
purchases by acquiring capital from different sources. The irrelevance theorem of Modigliani 
and Miller (1958) states that, in a tax-free world, the choice between debt and equity does not 
matter. In the real world, however, it is more complex, and there is an incentive to optimize the 
capital structure to maximize the value of a company, because of imperfections in the market. 
 
Innovation from R&D investments has become increasingly important to meet what seems like 
a never-ending demand for new technological products and services. Furthermore, as more 
firms become technology-minded, intangible assets constitute growing parts of their total 
assets. In this thesis, we aim to explain what effect R&D intensity and intangible assets have 
on leverage. To do this, we have developed the following research question:  
 
Can R&D intensity and intangible assets help explain capital structure for IT services firms? 
The main focus of this study is to answer the question mentioned above and thereby understand 
the choices regarding capital structure and the factors that determine them. In a broad sense, we 
contribute to research by linking R&D intensity and intangible assets to capital structure 
choices. As R&D expenditures and intangible assets are factors with increased importance for 
firms in modern times, and, by analysing these factors in our thesis, we add new insight into 
their effect regarding capital structure. To analyse the effect of intangible assets and R&D 
intensity on capital structure, we adopt a panel data regression, including known determinants 
of capital structure as control variables, as well as macroeconomic factors. The effect is firstly 
measured on leverage ratio before we implement a two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimation 
by introducing an instrumental variable for R&D intensity, to establish a causal effect on 
changes in debt and equity.  
The results show that IT services follow other industries regarding the effect of the standard 
determinants on leverage. Furthermore, we observe a countercyclical debt ratio among IT 
services firms, with increased leverage during rescissions. We find a positive relationship from 
intangible assets on leverage, indicating that creditors accept such assets as collateral. Firms 
with high R&D intensity issue more equity and less debt, which lowers their overall leverage 
ratio. However, we find that most of the variation in leverage is captured by an unobserved 
time-invariant component, which reduces the significance of the abovementioned effects. 
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We begin by presenting the characteristics of the IT services industry and how the industry 
finances their investments. We do so to give the reader the necessary foundation about the 
industry before the analysis. Thereafter, we present relevant theory about capital structure. The 
theory helps in the creation of variables and hypothesis development. Next, we present our data 
and method with assumptions for the regressions, where we specify the collection and treatment 
of the data. We analyse the data and the results with regards to theory and previous empirical 
research. After the analysis, we summarize, conclude and answer the research question. Lastly, 
we highlight weaknesses for the thesis as well as suggestions for further research. We add useful 
attachments and information that was not included in the text in the appendix.   
 
2. IT Services Industry Characteristics and Financing 
IT services refers to the application of business and technical expertise to enable organizations 
in the creation, management, and optimization of or access to information and business 
processes (Gartner, 2019). The global IT services market size is proliferating and expected to 
reach USD 1.07 trillion by 2025, with a CAGR1 of 8.4% (Grandviewresearch, 2019). The global 
market share for IT services is largest in North America, Europe, and Asia Pacific. 
 
The growth of the IT services industry has been extraordinarily in the Asia Pacific region, where 
labour unit costs have been substantially lower than other regions. Harvin et al. (2014) states 
that the annual base salary of a senior Indian professional is estimated to be eight times lower 
than in the United Kingdom or France, nine times lower than in the United States, and as much 
as ten times lower than in Germany. In the United States (US), the tech industry employs more 
people than many of the biggest industries, including construction, finance, insurance, and 
vehicle equipment manufacturing. The IT services industry has shown substantial growth in 
employment and accounted for more than two million jobs in the US in 2015 (Forrest, 2016). 
As the market grows, so does the competition. In a report published by Harvin et al. (2014), 
they claim that IT services companies can no longer rely on their usual tactics to retain market 
share. Being at the forefront with big data, social media, internet of things2, increased mobility, 
and cost reduction will be crucial factors to retain market share.  
                                                
1 Compound annual growth rate. 
2 Internet of things is ICT systems where a large number of physical entities communicate with each other and 
with the internet. 
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In a report published by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
(2019), programming and information (IT services) are listed second by sectors on intangible 
intensity3, only behind the pharmaceutical industry. IT services companies tend to have high 
intangible intensity because they possess a substantial amount of computer software and 
patents, among other intangible assets. Consequently, the industry has a relatively low tangible 
intensity4. Having a low amount of tangible assets can make the process of applying for loans 
difficult, since these assets are commonly used as collateral. 
 
Technology companies are known to hold much cash, and the tech sector holds more than 50% 
of total corporate cash reserves in the U. S (Richardson, 2019). Having a low level of debt and 
much cash on hand gives flexibility in a quickly changing market, where sudden investments 
needs to be done. Furthermore, having high levels of cash makes it affordable to increase debt 
levels to spend on capital expenditures or R&D. 
 
The IT services industry tends to invest in projects with severe levels of uncertainty (Canarella 
& Miller, 2019). Thus, insiders of an IT services firm know more about the possibility of the 
firm’s success than outsiders. R&D projects can for instance involve trade secrets and/ or 
special solutions that only the company possess as their competitive advantage. Thus, the 
managers minimize the amount of information shared publicly. It is indicating that the industry, 
therefore, may face substantial financial constraints, which results in problems with adverse 
selection in IT services debt markets (Canarella & Miller, 2019).  IT services firms require large 
amounts of capital to fund R&D activity. However, the firms may have trouble accessing the 
debt markets because their investments, in general, are associated with high risk, and their 
investments cannot serve as adequate collateral. As mentioned, the industry has become 
especially important for growth in the economy, providing innovation and supplying numerous 
jobs, but acquiring funding for IT service firms remains troublesome. 
 
3. Literature review and hypothesis development 
In the following chapter, we present the evolution of capital structure theories and elaborate on 
agency cost and asymmetric information. Thereafter, we present determinants of capital 
                                                
3 Intangible assets to total assets. 
4 Tangible assets to total assets.	
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structure, based on previous empirical research, and introduce macroeconomic factors. Lastly, 
we develop our hypothesis regarding the effect of intangible assets and R&D intensity on 
capital structure.  
3.1 Literature Review 
The first to spark interest in the study of capital structure choices were Modigliani and Miller 
(1958). With simplified assumptions about real-life market conditions, they proved that a firm’s 
value is independent of its capital structure. Some years later, in 1963, they relaxed their 
assumptions of a tax-free world and argued that with tax-deductibility of interest payments, the 
value of a firm would increase with increased debt. However, with their logic, the question of 
why not all firms were fully leveraged arose. A reconciliation between the assumptions of 
Modigliani and Miller and observed firm behaviour was reached with the research of Baxter 
(1967) and his explanation of bankruptcy cost creating an optimal capital structure. Financial 
distress costs are one such example. If a firm fails to meet its debt obligations, it does not merely 
liquidate its assets for its creditors. According to Warner (1977), and Andrade and Kaplan 
(1998), a firm going through bankruptcy can cause the firm to lose somewhere between 1% and 
20% of its value. The size of the loss will depend on the types of assets the firm possesses (Long 
& Malitz, 1985). 
 
The next piece of the puzzle then became to determine the exact optimal structure. Kraus and 
Litzenberger’s (1973) trade-off theory found that weighing the benefit and cost of debt, a firm 
can choose a capital structure that maximizes its enterprise value. The benefit of the debt stems 
from tax deductibility, which is generated from interest expense, while the cost arises from the 
increased probability of default. The marginal benefit of increased leverage will be diminishing 
when the leverage ratio increases, in the same way, the marginal cost will be increasing. A 
company will, therefore, have to make a trade-off when choosing how much debt it will take 
on. The optimal level of debt, according to the theory, will be where the marginal benefit of 
debt equals the marginal cost. 
 
Myers and Majluf (1984)5 developed a model which did not try to explain an optimal capital 
structure, but rather how firms follow a certain preference in their choice of financing. They 
                                                
5 Donaldson (1961) was the first to introduce the pecking order theory, in a survey study among American firm 
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conclude that there are fewer costs and risks associated with financing through internally 
generated funds than externally as a consequence of asymmetrical information. A company’s 
board has a higher degree of information compared to external investors regarding the prospects 
of the firm. This can create uncertainty, which is reflected in the higher return demanded by 
external investors — the more uncertainty, the higher the return demanded. If internally 
generated funds are not sufficient to cover the firm’s need for finance, the firm will prefer to 
issue the least risky security (debt) and issue the most risky security (equity) only as a last 
resort.  
 
In comparison with the pecking order theory, which provides a clear prioritization of how firms 
choose their capital structure, the market timing theory is more dynamic in its reasoning. The 
theory states that firms prefer external equity when the cost of equity is low and prefer debt 
otherwise (Baker & Wurgler, 2002). It is the managers’ view on the relative cost of equity that 
works as the deciding factor. When the managers view the stock prices as overvalued, they will, 
according to the market timing theory, issue equity. When they view the shares as undervalued, 
they will repurchase equity. However, a manager’s view is subject to biases. According to 
investment banks, the most crucial factor to advise their clients on whether to finance between 
debt or equity is whether their clients’ share prices are at a 52-week high (Ater, 2017). Even 
though extensively researched, an optimal level of debt or universal theory has not yet been 
claimed, and according to Myers (2001), there is no reason to expect one either. In the next 
sections, we present agency costs and asymmetric information theories which in addition to the 
theories discussed above, helps explain choices of capital structure.  
3.1.1 Agency Costs 
The common textbook example regarding agency costs is the principal-agent problem. The 
problem occurs when an entity called the agent, can make decisions on behalf of another entity 
called the principal. The dilemma exists when agents acts in a way which are contrary to the 
best interests of the principal. One example of agency costs that can arise when there are 
conflicts of interest between stakeholders, is between equity holders and debt holders. 
Management may own shares in the company, and they may have incentives to increase the 
value of equity, despite what is desirable from creditors, who wants the firm to conduct safe 
investments which generates interest payments. When the risk of financial distress is high, such 
a conflict is most likely to occur. Agency costs is therefore an additional cost when increasing 
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the debt levels of a company, which will affect the optimal capital structure (Berk & DeMarzo, 
2017). IT services firms have very specialized physical and human capital, which is associated 
with increased financial distress (Berk & DeMarzo, 2014), thus conflicts between stakeholders 
is likely to be more prominent than in most other industries.  
 
There are also agency costs associated with debt overhang. The phenomena occur when a 
company has a debt burden so substantial that it cannot take on additional debt to finance future 
projects. In some cases, the debt burden can be so enormous that the company may have to drop 
positive-NPV6 projects even when they are risk-free. There is debt overhang when shareholders 
choose not to invest in positive-NPV projects as the earnings from these projects only would 
go to debt holders. 
 
Asset substitution problem is one type of agency costs. The problem occurs when a firm’s 
management deceives debt issuers by replacing safe assets (or projects) with risky assets (or 
projects) after a credit analysis has been carried out. For example, an IT services firm could sell 
a project as a low risk to creditors to get favourable debt rates. Then, after receiving the loan 
fund, the firm uses the funds for risky endeavours, and as such, transferring the unforeseen risk 
to creditors7. If the project is a success, it primarily benefits the equity holders, since the 
creditors will receive their fixed return based on the low-risk rate. In case the project is a failure, 
the creditors are the ones to take a loss. This gives a wealth transfer from existing debtholders 
to shareholders (Bah & Dumontier, 2001).  
 
Naturally, the creditors are aware of the problems related to agency costs, and to protect 
themselves from it, they either required a premium, issue credit with short maturity or use debt 
covenants. A longer debt maturity gives equity holders more opportunities to profit at the 
expense of debt holders. Thus, agency costs are smallest for short term debt (Berk & DeMarzo, 
2014). Debt covenants are restrictions on the actions the firm can take. Covenants may limit 
the company’s ability to pay dividends or restrict some types of investments that the company 
can take. 
                                                
6 Net present value. 
7 Also known as moral hazard.	
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3.1.2 Asymmetric Information 
George Akerlof (1970) is one of the most important contributors to the problem of asymmetric 
information. He presented the “the lemon’s problem”, which occurs if a buyer cannot observe 
the fair value of a good, and as a result is only willing to pay the average expected price. 
Therefore, only low-quality goods will be sold; this is referred to as adverse selection. 
  
Asymmetric information is also relevant when analysing capital structure. Asymmetric 
information often arises between managers and investors. Managers possess information about 
their own company, e.g., future strategic and financial prospects, that external investors and 
creditors cannot access. Especially for innovative firms, such as IT services firms, asymmetric 
information tends to be higher (Bah & Dumontier, 2001). For these firms, the value of their 
projects depends on confidentiality. Due to rivalry, innovative firms hesitate to share 
characteristics of the projects that could make them attractive to external investors/creditors, in 
fear of disclosing vital innovation-related knowledge. Since the information asymmetry 
remains high in fear of transferring technological knowledge to competitors, innovative firms 
are discouraged to issue new shares. These firm are, as a result, expected to prefer internal 
financing (Bah & Dumontier, 2001). 
 
Issuing new shares when management know they are undervalued is costly for the original 
shareholders (Berk & DeMarzo, 2017). Thus, managers who perceive the firm’s equity to be 
undervalued will prefer to fund new investments using debt or retained earnings. Consequently, 
when a firm issues equity, it signals to the investors that its equity might be overvalued. The 
outside investors are therefore not willing to pay the pre-announced price, leading to a fall in 
stock prices. According to Berk and DeMarzo (2017), several studies have confirmed this 
result, finding a 3% drop in stock price on average for US firms on the announcement of an 
equity issue. It is clear from empirical studies that relatively more equity is issued in capital 
markets where asymmetric information is prominent (Berk & DeMarzo, 2017). 
 
Asymmetric information plays a vital role regarding signalling. This can create a problem for 
companies with a high degree of asymmetric information between insiders and outsiders. If 
these firms where to sell equity to outside investors, the firm’s owners may signal that the future 
is not as promising as expected, otherwise they would have chosen debt to retain their 
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percentage claim of the firms’ revenue. Thus, signalling leads to new shares being undervalued 
and a preference for debt financing (Berk & DeMarzo, 2017). 
3.2 Determinants of Capital Structure 
3.2.1 Standard Factors 
Tangible assets 
Tangible assets are physical assets that can be transacted for some monetary value though the 
liquidity of different markets will vary. It is easier for outsiders to value tangible assets than 
intangible assets - which lowers expected distress costs. Tangible assets are simple to 
collateralize, and thus they reduce the agency costs of debt. Creditors should therefore be more 
willing to lend to companies with a high proportion of tangible assets, and better loan terms 
will be provided (Rajan & Zingales, 1995). The lower degree of asymmetric information due 
to the simplicity of valuing the assets for outsiders, gives a positive relationship between 
tangible assets and leverage ratio according to the trade-off theory (Kraus & Litzenberger, 
1973). Most studies find that higher tangibility indicates a lower risk for the lenders as well as 
reduced direct costs of bankruptcy. As a result, firms with higher tangibility exhibits higher 
leverage ratios.  
  
Size 
According to Frank and Goyal (2009), larger firms as measured by book assets are more diverse 
and will have lower default risk. According to the trade-off theory, a positive relationship 
between size and leverage is thus expected. In addition to Frank and Goyal (2009), Antoniou 
et al. (2008), and Sheikh and Wang (2011) also find the same positive relationship between 
firm size and leverage.  
 
On the other side, size may also be a proxy for the information outside investors have, which 
according to the pecking order theory, should increase the firm’s preference for equity relative 
to debt (Rajan & Zingales, 1995). Larger companies have more information available to 
external parties than smaller companies. Thus, larger companies will have lower asymmetric 
information associated with SEO8, and it will reduce the likelihood of mispricing of stocks. 
                                                
8 Secondary equity offering. 
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Titman and Wessels (1988), Hall et al. (2004) and Chakraborty (2010) find a negative 
relationship between size and leverage. However, the general understanding is in line with the 
trade-off theory, where larger firms tend to have more debt, and we believe that IT services 
firms will be affected in the same way. 
 
Profitability 
Profitable companies have lower expected costs related to financial distress and find interest 
tax shields more valuable. Furthermore, positive cash flows increase a company’s ability to 
meet its debt obligations (Frank & Goyal, 2009). As a result, the trade-off theory predicts a 
positive relationship between profitability and leverage. Al-Ajmi et al. (2009) and Kaur and 
Rao (2009) find this relationship in their studies. 
  
It is the pecking order theory that has the most support from empirical studies regarding 
profitability. As previously mentioned, the pecking order theory states that firms prefer internal 
funds over external funds and profitable firms will use their retained earnings when in need of 
funds, thus becoming less levered over time (Frank & Goyal, 2009).  
  
Market-to-book ratio 
Market-to-book ratio is the most widely used proxy for growth opportunities. From the pecking 
order theory, the relationship between growth opportunities and leverage is positive. High 
growth firms have a greater need for funds, and as a result, are expected to borrow more (Frank 
& Goyal, 2009).  
 
The trade-off theory predicts that growth opportunities reduces leverage as firms with high 
market-to-book ratios have higher costs of financial distress (Frank & Goyal, 2009). Another 
reason for the market-to-book ratio to have a negative relationship with leverage stems from 
the market timing theory. Rajan and Zingales (1995) find that firms tend to issue stock when 
their stock price is high relative to earnings or book value, and firms with high growth 
opportunities will prefer to issue equity over acquiring new debt.  
 
The agency costs related to debt overhang is highest for firms that have high future growth 
opportunities and require significant investments (Berk & DeMarzo, 2017). Empirical research 
by Kaur and Rao (2009) and Nunkoo and Boateng (2010) find a negative relationship between 
growth opportunities and leverage. 
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Dividend payout  
The trade-off theory predicts that firms paying dividends should hold more debt if they are 
viewed as less risky (Frank & Goyal, 2005). This positive relationship between dividend payout 
and leverage has, however, little support from empirical studies, and Frank and Goyal (2009) 
find a negative effect between the factors in a later study. 
The pecking order theory also have ambiguous results in what way dividend payout affects 
capital structure. Given that debt is preferable over equity, the financing hierarchy predicts a 
positive relationship. However, paying dividends indicates that a firm is subject to market 
surveillance and will have lower degree of asymmetric information. This leads to an inverse 
relationship between dividend payout and leverage, as there instead are more frequent equity 
issuances (Drobetz et al., 2013). The empirical study by Frank and Goyal (2009) shows that 
companies paying dividends tend to have lower leverage ratios, thus supporting a negative 
relationship between dividend payout and leverage. 
3.2.2 Macroeconomic Factors  
Stock market return (MSCI) 
An increasing return in the stock market implies a higher probability of an overvaluation of the 
stock price, which creates an incentive for the firm to issue equity as it has become relatively 
cheap. The market timing theory, therefore, implies a negative relationship between stock prices 
and leverage (Baker & Wurgler, 2002). This is accordance with Stulz (1996), and her research 
on risk management. The pecking order theory also predicts a negative relationship. Increasing 
stock performance can be associated with a higher stable cash flow, which in turn will lead to 
increased retained earnings. Higher free cash flow implies a reduced need for external capital 
and lower leverage. The trade-off theory stands opposite to this with its focus on agency costs. 
A greater return with corresponding higher cash flow will give equity holders an incentive to 
increase the debt as leverage reduces management control over the cash flow (Jensen, 1986). 
Increased stock prices will lead to a lower market-value-based leverage ratio. If the firm follows 
a target level leverage ratio, it will have to take on debt to maintain it (Frank & Goyal, 2009).  
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Inflation 
The literature regarding the effect of inflation is coherent and predicts a positive relationship to 
leverage (Hocman & Palmon, 1985). According to the market timing theory, in periods when 
inflation is relatively high in comparison to market interest rates, it is preferable to issue debt. 
The trade-off theory also exhibits a positive relationship between inflation and leverage due to 
the increased value of the tax-shield (Frank & Goyal, 2009). This is because of the reduced real 
interest rate when inflation rises. 
 
Recession 
The overall state of the economy is likely to affect firm capital structure in several ways. The 
trade-off theory predicts a decrease in leverage ratio during recessions as firm often exhibits 
lower profits. With lower profits, firms need less interest deduction to offset the firm’s pre-tax 
income, which leads to a lower optimal leverage ratio (Van Empel, 2012). 
 
According to the pecking order theory, the relationship is opposite. With lower profits, firms 
will have less internal funds to finance their operations and must tend to debt financing. 
Furthermore, the pecking order theory claims that share prices are generally low and 
undervalued because of fear in the market during a recession. This leads managers to prefer 
debt over equity. However, Lemmon et al. (2008) finds that capital structure tends to remain 
stable during recession, and the effects might first be visible after some time. 
 
Yield spread 
The difference between short and long-term rates is known to work as a leading indicator of the 
economic outlook. A low spread indicates pessimism in the market and a higher possibility of 
recession, while a high yield spread will predict the opposite (Dahlquist & Harvey, 2001). As 
the yield spread can function as an indicator for recession, we expect the same relationship 
between yields spread and leverage as with recession and leverage. An increase in the yield 
spread indicates better future economic prospects which should wield less debt for IT services 
companies. 
3.2.3 R&D Intensity Effect on Capital Structure 
Because R&D investments are hard to assess and monitor, they give managers increased 
possibilities to deceive lenders by pursuing riskier investments after they have received the 
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funds. Thus, the asset substitution problem suggests that R&D-intensive firms should receive 
higher interest rates and, as a result, prefer equity over debt when in need of funds. According 
to Berk and DeMarzo (2014), firms with high R&D expenditures and future growth 
opportunities invest in very specialized physical and human capital. Such capital is associated 
with high costs as a result of financial distress. Thus, the trade-off theory predicts an inverse 
relationship between R&D expenditures and leverage. 
 
On the contrary, Myers and Majluf’s (1984) pecking order theory suggests that more innovative 
firms are more reliant on external sources when financing and favour debt over new equity. 
Debt is preferred because innovative firms have high degree of asymmetric information 
between insiders and outsiders due to the uncertainty and discretion in their projects. Therefore, 
if these innovative firms were to finance themselves by issuing equity, it may signal a poor 
future, otherwise the managers would have chosen debt to keep their percentage claim of the 
firms’ revenue. Thus, issues related to signalling should make managers prefer debt financing. 
 
Firm-specific assets are assets which are more valuable relative to their use within a particular 
firm than they are in another firm (Balakrishnan & Fox, 1993). A firm with specific assets make 
liquidation a challenge in the case of bankruptcy. Common assets are associated with lower 
uncertainty, as they are re-deployable; their value is the same for any other independent agent 
(Bah & Dumontier, 2001). Specific assets, however, come with higher uncertainty and reduced 
value when liquidating a firm. Creditors are aware of the assets a firm holds; thus, they demand 
a higher risk premium from firms with more specific assets. An R&D investment should, by 
nature, result in specific assets, and, as discussed, these assets increase the transaction costs on 
debt financing. Therefore R&D-intensive firms should favour equity financing over debt 
financing.  
 
However, Lee and Lee (2019) find that biotechnology companies are more likely to finance 
their R&D investments with debt. The characteristics of the biotechnology industry are similar 
in many respects to those of the IT services industry – especially regarding the high R&D 
expenditures. Like biotechnology firms, IT services firms are to some extent dependent on their 
ability to develop new products (e.g., IT solutions) with which to secure future commercial 
success. As for the need to fund R&D investments, IT services firms should acquire debt though 
there is a risk premium. 
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Overall, how does R&D intensity effect leverage? Capital structure theories pull in opposite 
directions. One the one hand, the trade-off theory predicts a negative relationship between R&D 
intensity and debt. This relationship stems from the fact that innovative firms investing heavily 
in specialized physical and human capital, which is associated with increased financial distress. 
On the other hand, the pecking order theory predicts a positive relation between R&D and 
leverage due to signalling leading to an undervaluation of new shares. Previous empirical work 
is also divided. Bah and Dumontier (2001) provide evidence that R&D investments lead to 
specific assets which in turn receive higher risk premiums from creditors, thereby resulting in 
a preference for equity over debt. However, Lee and Lee (2019) report a positive relation 
between R&D intensity and leverage in their study of biotechnology companies, which exhibits 
characteristics similar to those of the IT services industry. Though the theories and literature 
are divided, we believe that the IT services industry will follow the biotechnology industry due 
to their similarities. Thus, the first hypothesis is formulated in the following way: 
 
Hypothesis 1 (H1): R&D intensity has a positive effect on debt for IT services firms.  
 
3.2.4 Intangible Assets Effect on Capital Structure 
An intangible asset is an identifiable, non-monetary asset without physical substance. One can 
identify such an asset when it is separable, or when it comes from contracts or other legal rights 
(IFRS, 2019). The figures we find in companies’ financial statements are measurable, with 
some exceptions (e.g., acquisition goodwill), and, to some extent, they should function as 
collateral in the same way tangible assets do. Patents, computer software, and domains are 
among the intangible assets that can be identified and sold. Nevertheless, these intangible assets 
are, in most instances, more difficult to value than tangible assets such as property, plant, and 
equipment.  
  
Intangible assets can support debt through their ability to create cash flow. Many customers 
choose Coca-Cola as their preferred soft drink even if they could not tell the difference from a 
cheaper brand of cola in a blind test. Coca-Cola’s brand thus helps generate cash flow (Lim et 
al., 2019). When lending, creditors are highly interested in the borrower’s ability to generate 
cash flow, which indicates that intangible assets can help support debt. 
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However, Myers (2001) claims that high business risk increases the chances of financial distress 
and that intangible assets are more likely to lose value under financial distress. As mentioned 
in the previous section, the possession of specific assets might make liquidation difficult in case 
of bankruptcy. To re-deploy intangible assets can be challenging, and agency problems can 
limit the use of intangible assets by anyone other than the original owners (Rampini & 
Viswanathan, 2013). Thus, according to the trade-off theory, a company with relatively more 
intangible assets will take on less debt. In the same vein, Lim et al. (2019) argue that intangible 
assets can be unimportant when a firm already has sufficient levels of tangible assets with which 
to support their desired debt. Lim et al. (2019) also argue that lenders traditionally view 
intangible assets as riskier than tangible assets, thus making equity financing more appropriate. 
 
Intangible assets count for an increasing proportion of the total value of firms. Furthermore, we 
believe that intangible assets have a positive effect on leverage, as any valuable assets should 
contribute at least somewhat to increasing a firm’s debt capacity. However, this effect can be 
small or even insignificant. Thus, our second hypothesis is formulated in the following way: 
 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): Intangible assets supports debt for IT services firms. 
 
 
4. Data and Methodology 
In this chapter, we elaborate on the methodology and data used in our study. First, we describe 
our work on collecting the final data sample. Then we define our variables and provide 
descriptive statistics. Lastly, we describe the methodology used.   
4.1 Data Sources and Sample Selection 
We acquired the financial statements of listed IT services companies in the period 2006-2018 
from the Compustat Global database. Only companies that have been listed on stock exchange 
during the period of interest are added to our final sample. To get a refined and appropriate 
selection of companies, we have filtered by the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes 
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73719, 737210, 737311 and 737412 (SEC, 2019). As the companies are located in different 
countries and file their reports in different currencies, all data is converted to American dollars 
to be comparable13. We are aware of the inaccuracies that can arise from the fact that companies 
from different countries report their financial statements with varying rules of accounting. By 
gathering all data from one database, we mitigate some of these inaccuracies.  
We remove firm-years where the total value of assets is below USD 1 million. This is in line 
with the work of Drobetz et al. (2013) on capital structure. Furthermore, companies with two 
or less coherent firm-years are removed. When obtaining R&D expenses from Compustat, we 
observe a significant number of firms who do not report R&D expenses. By manually checking 
a sample of firms with missing R&D expenses with their respective annual reports, we found 
that the companies did indeed report zero R&D or didn’t report any R&D at all. Therefore, we 
record missing R&D expenses to zero, following Frank and Goyal (2009). As we later introduce 
a R&D tax subsidy variable which represents each country’s implied tax subsidy in a given 
year, we limit our sample to countries where this information can be obtained. Some countries 
are therefore omitted, even though they represent a moderate share of the listed IT services 
firms, such as India. However, by running the regressions without omitting any countries, we 
get similar results. Indicating that our results are unlikely to be affected by this selection. To 
make sure extreme values and outliers do not influence this study, we winsorize14 all control 
and dependent variables in both tails at a 1% level. The final sample consists of 808 firms from 
26 countries, equal to 7127 firm-years, due to missing observations of some firms in specific 
years. In some models, the sample size will be more limited due to missing values in certain 
variables. The macroeconomic factors are retrieved from different sources15. 
4.2 Defining Variables 
The choice of variables is based on the discussions of determinants of capital structure in 
Chapter 3. In this section, we provide a technical description of how the various variables are 
                                                
9 7371 = Computer programming services. 
10 7372 = Prepackaged software. 
11 7373 = Computer integrated systems design. 
12 7374 = Computer processing & data preparation. 
13 The exchange rates were obtained from Datastream. We used a yearly average of the exchange rates to convert 
to US dollars. 
14 Winsorizing is the procedure of limiting extreme values in the data. By winsorizing at upper (lower) 1%, 
values above (below) this threshold will be replaced by the cut off value. Dummy variables are not winsorized.	
15 See appendix Table A2 for all sources for different variables. 
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constructed. We use the terms from Compustat so that the reader can recognize the entries from 
the annual accounts. Table A1 in the appendix shows the structure of the included variables.  
4.2.1 Dependent Variables 
When defining leverage, most studies tend to use some sort of leverage ratio. Frank and Goyal 
(2009) and Titman and Wessels (1988) used a sum of short- and long- term debt divided by 
total assets. However, there is a split opinion of whether one should use book or market values 
for assets. Barclay et al. (2006) claim that market leverage is forward-looking, while book 
leverage is backward-looking. Myers (1977) point out that the focus should be on book leverage 
since it reflects the company’s assets right now. He elaborates that book values are not 
necessarily more accurate than stock market values, but simply that they refer to assets already 
in place. Frank and Goyal (2009), however, argue that when measuring leverage in a specific 
industry, a market-based leverage ratio is preferable, but further states that the market value of 
the debt may be volatile and difficult to quantify. 
 
To broaden the scope of our thesis we will include both book and market leverage ratios as 
measurements for leverage. Naturally, the results between the two methods will deviate from 
one another to some extent. A few scholars interpret cash on hand as negative debt and thus 
subtract cash from the measurement of debt. Since IT services firms in general hold little debt 
and a substantial amount of cash, we follow Drobetz et al. (2013) and Frank and Goyal (2009), 
and measure leverage without taking cash into account to get comparable results. Our 
dependent variables will hereafter be referred to as Book leverage and Market leverage. The 
two variables are defined as follows: 
 
Book leverage	= Long term debt	+	Debt in current liabilities
Total assets
                               (1)                                                       
 
 
Market leverage	=	 Long term debt	+	Debt in current liabilities
Total assets	-	Common equity	+	Market value of equity                             (2) 
 
 
As the measurements above cannot with certainty capture whether the effect on leverage ratio 
is due to a relative change in either debt or equity, we add two dependent variables that looks 
specifically on the issuances of debt or equity. We construct one dependent variable for change 
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in total debt16, and one dependent variable for change in equity. For equity, we measure the 
change by the change in number of shares outstanding17. The variables are created such that the 
value reported in period t equals the change between period t and t+1. 
 
∆Debt = ∆ Long Term debt	+	Debt in current liabilities           (3) 
 
∆Equity	= ∆ Common shares                          (4) 
4.2.2 Standard Factors 
Tangible assets (Tangibility) 
We calculate tangibility as a fraction of property, plant, and equipment over total assets, 
following Frank and Goyal (2009) and Drobetz et al. (2013).  
 
Tangibility	=	 Property, plant and equipment
Total assets
           (5) 
 
Market-to-book (M/B) 
Market-to-book is a commonly used measurement for growth opportunity and is present in 
numerous empirical papers (Lim et al., 2019; Frank & Goyal, 2009; Drobetz et al., 2013). 
 
M B = Total assets	-	Ordinary equity	+	Market value of equity
Total assets
          (6) 
 
Profitability (Profit) 
We design the variable for a company’s profitability as the ratio between operating profit before 
depreciation and total assets. 
 
Profit	=	 Operating income before depreciation
Total assets
            (7) 
 
Size (LNSize) 
When determining a company’s size, we use the natural logarithm of the book value of total 
assets. An alternative measure for size is the natural logarithm of sales. The two types are quite 
                                                
16 Total debt is a sum of Compustat items: Long term debt + Debt in current liabilities. 
17 Adjusted for stock splits and reverse stock splits. 
23	
	
similar, and within our sample, strongly correlate18. We follow Frank and Goyal (2009) and 
Bah and Dumotier (2001), among others, and use the natural logarithm of assets as a proxy for 
size.  
 
LNSize	=	Ln Total assets               (8) 
 
Dividend payout ratio (Dividend) 
We calculate the dividend payout ratio as a fraction of total dividends paid in a given year over 
the net income in the same year. Even though Frank and Goyal (2009) showed in a working 
paper that a dividend dummy variable works empirically, we construct the actual dividend 
payout ratio to avoid loss of information. The variable is constructed as follows: 
 
Dividend = Dividends
Net income
                  (9) 
 
4.2.3 R&D and Intangibility 
R&D intensity (R&DInt) and R&D dummy (R&DFirm) 
Following Bah and Dumotier (2001), we measure R&D intensity as a fraction of R&D 
expenditures to sales, as presented in equation (10). We also add a dummy variable to 
differentiate between companies reporting R&D and those who don’t, as shown in equation 
(11).   
 
R&DInt	=	 R&D expenditures
Sales
            (10) 
 
R&DFirm	=	1 if R&D expenditures	>	0, in year t0 if R&D expenditures	=	0, in year t                         (11)  
                               
 
Intangibility (Intangibility) 
Tangibility and intangibility19 are prone to being affected by mechanical relations, since the 
sum of goodwill, intangible and tangible assets, divided by total assets, sums to one. Prior 
                                                
18 In our data sample Ln(Size) and Ln(Sales) have a correlation coefficient of p=0.83 
19 Ratio of intangible assets to total assets. 
24	
	
studies usually find a positive relationship between tangibility and leverage ratio, indicating a 
negative relationship between intangibility and leverage ratio (Lim et al., 2019). To avoid 
perfect negative multicollinearity between tangibility and intangibility, we use property, plant 
and equipment as a proxy for tangible assets, and subtract goodwill from intangible assets. In 
this manner, we allow both tangibility and intangibility to have the same sign in a regression. 
 
Intangibility	=	 Intangible assets	-	Goodwill
Total assets
           (12) 
4.2.4 Macroeconomic Factors 
Stock market return, inflation, recession and yield spread 
We add macroeconomic factors to our model to account for global effects. We use the MSCI20 
World Index to observe the return of the stock market21. By using the stock market return, we 
aim to capture the effect of economic expansions and recessions. We collect data on inflation 
from OECD22, and yield spread from Federal Reserve23. Data on recessions are from the 
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER, 2019), and we follow their definition of a 
recession. The three abovementioned variables are all presented in percentages. A given year 
is assigned the value one if at least six months of that year is defined as recession, and in our 
period of interest, only 2008 and 2009 are defined as recession-years.  
4.3 Regression Method and Specification 
In order to answer our hypothesis, we perform a panel data regression. As our sample consists 
of 12 years and 808 companies, we follow Petersen’s (2009) recommendation to cluster 
standard errors by the more frequent cluster. Therefore, to control for serial correlation within 
firm-data, we use clustered standard errors at firm-level, but include year fixed effects. When 
using clustered standard errors, we also control for heteroskedasticity in the regression output 
(Petersen, 2009). 
The base regressions specification used in this study is: 
                                                
20 Morgan Stanley Capital International. 
21 Data retrieved from: https://www.msci.com/documents/10199/178e6643-6ae6-47b9-82be-e1fc565ededb  
22 Data retrieved from: https://data.oecd.org/price/inflation-cpi.htm  
23 Data retrieved from: https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/T10Y3M	
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Yi,t	=	α + βXi,t + εi,t,                                             (13) 
Yi,t	=	α + βXi,t + cf + θt + εi,t,         (14) 
where Yi,t denotes the dependent variable for firm i at time t, and "	is the intercept. #$%,' 
represents the regression coefficients for the different independent variables. Lastly, εi,t captures 
the effects of factors that are not included as explanatory variables. The model presented in 
equation (14) includes three sub-specifications, which involve either calendar year fixed effects 
(θt), firm fixed effects (cf), or both. We do so following Drobetz et al. (2013) to account for 
unobserved heterogeneity across time and at the firm level. 
As changes in leverage ratio can emerge from changes in debt and/or equity, we try to establish 
a causal relationship between these variables and R&D intensity by utilizing a 2SLS model 
with ∆Debt and ∆Equity as dependent variables. We do so by estimating # from equation (13) 
and (14) using an exogenous source of variation in R&D expenditures. 
4.4 Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 provides a summary of the descriptive statistics for the variables used in this thesis. As 
mentioned earlier, all the variables, except dummies, are winsorized at the upper and lower one 
percentile to reduce the effect of outliers and extreme observations. To put our data into 
perspective, we will compare them to those of Frank and Goyal (2009) and Bessler et al. (2013) 
and their work on capital structure. In Graph 1, we also provide the average leverage ratio by 
year for IT services firms compared to the average of companies in G7 countries. In appendix 
A3, a list of included countries and their respective share of observations is included. 
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
As Graph 1 on the following page depicts, the IT services industry exhibits a lower leverage 
ratio compared to the average of companies in G7 countries. By examining Table 1, IT services 
firms have an average market (book) leverage of 8.7% (11.5%). Frank and Goyal’s (2009) study 
on capital structure of publicly traded American firms from 1950 to 2003 find this to be 28% 
(29%). Bessler et al. (2013) observe the book leverage ratio to be 24.4% for 20 developed 
countries between 1980 and 2011.  
Market value of equity is forward-looking, in the aspect that it takes the future growth 
opportunity into account (Berk & DeMarzo, 2014). For firms with positive prospects, investors 
will value its equity beyond the book value. For the IT services industry, investors seem to 
expect future growth, and as a result, the market equity will be higher than book equity. Thus, 
the industry market leverage will, on average, be lower than book leverage. However, in 2008, 
the gap between Book leverage and Market leverage almost closes. Implying that for the 
average IT services firm, the equity capital was close to being valued by investors below its 
book value. Not an unusual trait following the financial crisis as the investors had a deteriorating 
view on the market. 
 
 
      Percentiles  
     N   Mean   Median   Std. Dev.   min   p25   p75   max 
Dependent variables         
 Book leverage 7127 .115 .051 .149 0 0 .187 .671 
 Market leverage 6413 .087 .027 .123 0 0 .134 .548 
  ΔDebt 6307 .019 0 .091 -1 -.058 .029 2.095 
  ΔEquity 5800 .023 0 .043 -.234 0 .045 .821 
Company specific variables        
 R&DInt 7127 .073 .023 .102 0 0 .116 .447 
 R&DFirm 7127 .717 1 .451 0 0 1 1 
 Intangibility 7127 .073 .03 .097 0 .008 .099 .417 
 Tangibility 7127 .082 .037 .105 .003 .018 .097 .472 
 M/B 6413 1.85 1.436 1.088 .768 1.004 2.388 4.153 
 Profit 7127 .087 .091 .111 -.272 .043 .145 .337 
 LNSize 7127 4.549 4.322 1.436 2.441 3.468 5.346 8.272 
 Dividend 7127 .169 0 .372 -.623 0 .262 2.323 
Macroeconomic variables        
 Inflation 7127 .02 .022 .009 .004 .016 .026 .036 
 MSCI 7127 .078 .096 .179 -.403 -.003 .206 .308 
 Spread 7127 .018 .019 .011 -.003 .01 .021 .038 
 Recession 7127 .151 0 .358 0 0 0 1 
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Graph 1 
Average Leverage Ratio by Year 
The graph presents yearly average leverage ratios for the IT services industry and for companies 
in G7 countries. The IT services sample consists of 808 firms, while the G7 sample contains 
5975 firms. All data are collected from the Compustat Global database. 
On average, both Book leverage and Market leverage are considerably lower for IT services 
firms than for the average industrial company from the US or the G7. 28% of our observations 
show zero total debt. It is perhaps not surprising that we observe such a high number for the IT 
services industry. Strebulaev and Yang (2013) find that 14% of nonfinancial US-firms have 
zero leverage, and as IT services firms have little debt in general, we would expect this number 
to be higher for our industry.  
As expected, the low leverage ratio for IT services firms is accompanied by a low tangibility. 
The average tangibility-measure is at 8.2% for IT services firms while the average for 20 
developed countries is at 29.5% (Bessler et al., 2013). Consequently, the industry will have a 
relative high degree of intangible assets before controlling for goodwill. IT services rank second 
(only behind pharmaceuticals) across all industries when measuring intangible assets to total 
assets (Demmou et al., 2019). When focusing on the identifiable intangible assets on the balance 
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sheet, and by subtracting goodwill, we find that they constitute about 7.3% of total assets. 
R&DInt is, on average, twice as high as Besler’s et al. (2013) findings, and approximately 72% 
of the total observations show R&D expenses.  
For most of the variables, the mean is above the median, which indicates that the variables are 
right-skewed. Market leverage has fewer observations than Book leverage due to missing 
values of stock prices for certain years. M/B is also a variable created from the market value of 
equity, and therefore shows the same number of observations as Market leverage. For the 
remaining unabbreviated variables, we find them to be consistent we previous literature. 
Correlation 
To determine if multicollinearity is an issue in our dataset, we perform a Pearson correlation 
test and present the results in Table 2 below. Most coefficients are relatively small and does not 
indicate much correlation between the variables. However, some observations are worth further 
exploration. Book leverage and Market leverage shows the highest correlation and is in line 
with what we expected between our dependent variables. M/B and Market leverage have a 
negative coefficient of -0.367. We are not surprised with this moderate correlation due to the 
negative mechanical relationship that exists between the variables. R&DInt and R&DFirm also 
exhibits a moderate correlation due to the construction of the R&D dummy. Companies with a 
large share of tangibility and intangibility tend to have higher leverage ratios, while high levels 
of M/B, R&DInt, and R&DFirm trend in the opposite direction. To ΔDebt and ΔEquity the R&D 
variables show a negative and positive sign, respectively. This is somewhat contrary to that we 
would expect as hypothesis 1 predicts a positive relationship between R&D intensity and debt. 
However, further analysis is necessary before accepting or rejecting the hypothesis. For 
Intangibility, the coefficients are positive and in line with our expectations.  
All of the independent variables show similar correlation sign to Book leverage and Market 
leverage24. The correlation matrix does not lead us to suspect a problem with multicollinearity 
in our data. To support the conclusion of the Pearson correlation test, we have conducted VIF-
tests25. These tests did not provide any reason to suspect multicollinearity.	 
                                                
24 With an exception being Spread. 
25 Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) test. All values are below 5. 
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Table 2 
Pearson Correlation Matrix 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
(1) Book leverage 1.000                
(2) Market leverage 0.874 1.000               
(3)  ΔDebt -0.045 -0.052 1.000              
(4)  ΔEquity 0.039 0.007 -0.007 1.000             
(5) R&DInt -0.108 -0.161 -0.015 0.030 1.000            
(6) R&DFirm -0.114 -0.129 -0.007 0.083 0.449 1.000           
(7) Intangibility 0.079 0.052 0.042 0.038 0.161 0.081 1.000          
(8) Tangibility 0.194 0.223 0.006 0.022 -0.117 -0.058 -0.177 1.000         
(9) M/B -0.144 -0.367 0.061 0.118 0.208 0.090 0.038 -0.085 1.000        
(10) Profit -0.141 -0.160 0.023 -0.091 -0.190 0.009 0.017 0.009 0.198 1.000       
(11) LNSize 0.139 0.076 0.066 -0.083 -0.066 0.111 -0.035 0.059 0.023 0.152 1.000      
(12) Dividend -0.111 -0.120 0.001 -0.071 -0.041 0.095 -0.031 0.018 0.021 0.190 0.132 1.000     
(13) MSCI -0.017 -0.063 0.017 0.024 -0.016 0.001 -0.005 0.000 0.101 0.020 -0.005 0.012 1.000    
(14) Inflation 0.022 0.065 -0.040 -0.014 -0.021 -0.052 -0.006 0.007 -0.108 -0.009 -0.001 -0.026 -0.566 1.000   
(15) Spread -0.007 0.040 -0.019 -0.005 -0.014 -0.004 0.001 0.023 -0.118 0.020 -0.032 0.011 0.136 -0.547 1.000  
(16) Recession 0.030 0.101 -0.042 -0.060 -0.037 -0.066 -0.005 0.020 -0.190 -0.029 -0.026 -0.008 -0.314 0.031 0.429 1.000 
30	
	
5. Results and Discussion 
In the following sections, we present and interpret the results of our models. We interpret the 
variables with respect to capital structure theory, previous empirical findings, and our 
hypotheses. Initially, we ran regressions with Book leverage and Market leverage as dependent 
variables. We also tested for a causal effect between R&D intensity and leverage through an 
instrumental variable approach by using a 2SLS estimation.  
5.1 Determinants of Leverage Ratio 
The first column in Table 3 is an OLS model. In columns (2) and (3), we add firm and year-
fixed effects separately. This makes it possible to distinguish between both time-varying and 
time-constant effects and firm-varying and firm-constant effects. In Column (4), we add both 
fixed effects. Lastly, Column (5) includes macroeconomic factors but excludes year-fixed 
effects, as time effects are likely to capture some of the impact of the macroeconomic factors. 
 
Table 3 
Panel Data Regression to Estimate Determinants of Capital Structure 
The table shows the results of the leverage regressions using a sample of 808 listed IT services 
firms during the period from 2006 to 2018. Standard errors clustered at firm level are given in 
parenthesis. Firm FE and Year FE indicate whether firm and calendar year fixed effects are 
included in the specification. The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
      
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dep. Var: Book leverage     
R&DInt -0.149*** -0.007 -0.150*** -0.006 -0.008 
 (0.039) (0.050) (0.040) (0.049) (0.049) 
R&DFirm -0.023** -0.004 -0.023** -0.000 -0.002 
 (0.010) (0.008) (0.010) (0.007) (0.008) 
Intangibility 0.207*** 0.018 0.207*** 0.024 0.022 
 (0.042) (0.043) (0.042) (0.044) (0.043) 
Tangibility 0.271*** 0.344*** 0.274*** 0.336*** 0.339*** 
 (0.060) (0.069) (0.060) (0.068) (0.068) 
M/B -0.011*** -0.001 -0.011*** 0.001 0.000 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
Profit -0.192*** -0.219*** -0.189*** -0.223*** -0.221*** 
 (0.034) (0.036) (0.035) (0.036) (0.036) 
LNSize 0.016*** 0.031*** 0.016*** 0.034*** 0.032*** 
 (0.003) (0.009) (0.003) (0.010) (0.009) 
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The effect of standard variables 
Tangibility and LNSize have a positive impact on Book leverage and Market leverage. The 
effect is significant at the 1% level. The significance level of the coefficients is similar in all 
columns, thereby supporting the common belief that tangible assets works as collateral and that 
larger firms tend to have higher leverage ratios (Bessler et al., 2013; Antoniou et al., 2008; 
Sheikh & Wang, 2011). In Column (4), we observe that a percentage point increase in 
Tangibility results in a 0.336 (0.192) percentage point increase for Book leverage (Market 
leverage), all else being equal. Though there is no clear definition of what to classify as 
Dividend -0.038*** -0.005 -0.038*** -0.004 -0.005 
 (0.006) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) 
MSCI     0.010 
     (0.008) 
Inflation     0.322 
     (0.238) 
Spread     -0.451** 
     (0.198) 
Recession     0.015*** 
     (0.005) 
Year FE No No Yes Yes No 
Firm FE No Yes No Yes Yes 
N 6413 6413 6413 6413 6413 
adj. R2 0.131 0.684 0.131 0.686 0.686 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dep. Var: Market leverage     
R&DInt -0.101*** -0.030 -0.105*** -0.026 -0.031 
 (0.028) (0.031) (0.029) (0.031) (0.031) 
R&DFirm -0.017** -0.002 -0.017** 0.003 0.001 
 (0.008) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) 
Intangibility 0.143*** 0.007 0.143*** 0.013 0.009 
 (0.031) (0.032) (0.031) (0.032) (0.032) 
Tangibility 0.223*** 0.205*** 0.224*** 0.192*** 0.197*** 
 (0.048) (0.043) (0.048) (0.042) (0.042) 
M/B -0.035*** -0.026*** -0.034*** -0.021*** -0.022*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
Profit -0.115*** -0.141*** -0.116*** -0.151*** -0.146*** 
 (0.022) (0.026) (0.023) (0.026) (0.026) 
LNSize 0.009*** 0.028*** 0.009*** 0.035*** 0.030*** 
 (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.007) (0.005) 
Dividend -0.031*** -0.006* -0.031*** -0.005* -0.005* 
 (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) 
MSCI     0.003 
     (0.006) 
Inflation     0.696*** 
     (0.204) 
Spread     0.110 
     (0.165) 
Recession     0.016*** 
     (0.005) 
Year FE No No Yes Yes No 
Firm FE No Yes No Yes Yes 
N 6413 6413 6413 6413 6413 
adj. R2 0.228 0.720 0.228 0.726 0.724 
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“economically significant”, we would argue that the coefficients’ seem quite large and that they 
indicate economic significance.  
 
Profit has a negative impact on leverage ratio. The coefficient is significant at the 1% level for 
all columns, regardless of the dependent variable. High profitability leads to increased FCF26, 
which in turn will lead to more internally generated funds and reduce the need for external 
financing (Park & Pincus, 1997). This finding is consistent with the pecking order theory. 
Therefore, our results indicate that profitable IT services firms can use retained earnings to fund 
their projects instead of issuing debt.  
 
Dividend has a negative sign in all columns. Using Market leverage as our dependent variable, 
the negative coefficients from Dividend are significant at the 1% level in columns (1) and (3), 
and they are significant at the 10% level in the remaining columns. All else being equal, a one 
percentage point increase in the dividend ratio results in a 0.038 (0.031) percentage point 
decrease in Book leverage (Market leverage) in Column (3). The effect of the dividend payout 
seems reasonable form an economic point of view, as dividend-paying firms have enough 
retained earnings to pay dividend and finance their projects from internal funds. If these firms 
had insufficient internally generated funds, they might hold back dividend payments. Our 
findings follow empirical research (Rajan & Zingales, 1995; Frank & Goyal, 2009; Drobetz et 
al., 2013), and we find that IT services firms that pay dividends tend to have lower leverage 
ratios. 
 
The M/B coefficients are negative across all columns and significant at the 1% level for Market 
leverage. This could be related to IT services firms with high growth opportunities having 
higher financial distress which therefore leads them to obtain unfavourable rates from creditors 
(Wilner, 2000). Consequently, they turn to equity financing, in accord with the trade-off theory. 
For Book leverage the significance disappears when firm-fixed effects are included. The 
difference in significance between Book leverage and Market leverage probably stems from the 
negative mechanical relationship between Market leverage and M/B. Frank and Goyal (2009) 
report similar results and claim that growth opportunity loses its reliable impact when book 
leverage is studied. 
 
                                                
26 Free cash flow. 
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We observe a higher explanatory power for Market leverage than for Book leverage, which is 
in agreement with prior studies (Drobetz et al., 2013; Lemmon et al., 2008). More importantly, 
we find that adding firm-fixed effects to the OLS considerably increases adjusted R-squares. In 
columns (1) and (2), we see an increase in adjusted R-squares from 13.1% to 68.4% when Book 
leverage is used as the dependent variable. This supports the conclusion that the capital 
structure of IT services firms is to a large extent explained by an unobserved time-invariant 
component.  
A. The Effect of R&D Intensity on Leverage Ratio 
The R&DFirm dummy shows a significantly negative coefficient at the 5% level in columns 
(1) and (3) for both Book leverage and Market leverage. The negative coefficients in these 
models imply that firms which have R&D expenditures tend to have a lower leverage ratio than 
firms which report zero R&D expenditures. By controlling for firm-fixed effects, the difference 
between the firms disappears. Furthermore, the magnitude of the coefficients is relatively low 
and does not lead us to believe that simply having R&D expenditures alone will have an 
economically significant effect on leverage. 
 
All of the estimated signs of the R&DInt coefficients are negative for both measurements of 
leverage. The coefficients are significant at the 1% level in columns (1) and (3) but lose their 
significance when firm-fixed effects are included. Several explanations can account for the 
negative effect on leverage. First, IT services firms with high R&D investments may have 
trouble accessing debt markets, as these investments are perceived as risky and do not serve as 
good collateral (Canarella & Miller, 2019). Because of the asset substitution problem, 
companies with high R&D investments exhibit high agency costs of debt, as it is easier for 
management to pursue a riskier investment once a firm has received the funds. Also, investing 
in R&D tends to result in specific assets which cannot be sold easily. Firm-specific assets 
therefore make liquidation in case of bankruptcy challenging. This uncertainty for specific 
assets and the value they return when liquidating a firm makes creditors demand a higher risk 
premium (Balakrishnan & Fox, 1993). 
 
In total, R&D expenditures seem to have a negative effect on leverage; however, the effect is 
insignificant when firm-fixed effects are controlled for. This seems to invalidate hypothesis 1. 
This negative effect does not necessarily imply a negative effect between R&D intensity and 
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debt. The negative effect on leverage may stem from a positive change in debt and equity, but 
a relatively larger change in equity. Thus, in Section 5.2, we adopt changes in debt and equity 
as dependent variables to be able to fully reject or accept hypothesis 1. 
B. The Effect of Intangible Assets on Leverage Ratio 
We observe a positive relationship between Intangibility in all columns for both dependent 
variables. In columns (1) and (3), the coefficients are significant at the 1% level. When firm-
fixed effects are accounted for, the signs remain positive, but insignificant. This positive effect 
might indicate that identifiable intangible assets can create cash flows for IT services firms. 
Creditors favour firms with steady cash flows, and will provide lower interest rates, even though 
the assets are not collateralizable. This should increase the firm’s debt and result in a higher 
leverage ratio (Lim et al., 2019). 
 
When we compare the effects of intangible and tangible assets on book leverage, the point 
estimates for Intangibility are consistently smaller. Nevertheless, the magnitude is still quite 
sizeable. For Book leverage in Column (3), the coefficient for Tangibility is significant at 0.274, 
while that for Intangibility is significant at 0.207. The smaller point estimate for Intangibility 
versus Tangibility indicates that an increase in tangible assets has a larger impact on leverage 
ratio than an equally large increase in intangible assets. However, Lim et al. (2019) state that 
point estimates should be compared with caution, as tangible-asset measures are more precise 
than intangible-assets measures. According to their study, identifiable intangible assets support 
debt financing as much as tangible assets do. Our results do not support this finding. This might 
be because common tangible assets (e.g., property, plant, and equipment) are easier to re-deploy 
than intangible assets for IT services firms. 
 
Macroeconomic factors 
In the fifth column, we include macroeconomic factors into our regression, which only 
marginally helps in increasing the explanatory power from Column (2). Increased stock market 
returns, as measured by MSCI, have a minimal point estimate and do not show any significance 
in explaining either Book leverage or Market leverage. 
 
 Inflation exhibits a positive relationship with both leverage measures, which is in line with the 
pecking order theory, according to which increased inflation leads to the increased value of the 
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tax-shield and consequently to more debt. The inflation coefficient is significant at the 1% level 
for Market leverage but insignificant when Book leverage is the dependent variable. The 
coefficient for Inflation can be interpreted as a one percentage point increase in inflation, which 
yields a 0.696 percentage point increase in Market leverage, all else being equal. This seems to 
be a relatively large effect, and its magnitude is not well explained with economic intuition. 
Nevertheless, a positive inflation coefficient is consistent with Frank and Goyal’s (2009) 
finding that companies tend to have higher leverage ratios when inflation is high. According to 
Taggart (1985), the real value of interest tax deduction on leverage is larger when inflation is 
expected to be high. This results in a positive predicted relationship according to the trade-off 
theory.  
 
The effect of yield spread is divided. When Market leverage is the dependent variable, the 
Spread coefficient is positive but insignificant, but when we consider Book leverage, we 
observe a negative and significant coefficient at the 5% level. A low yield spread may signal 
recession in subsequent periods; hence, the significantly negative relation between Spread and 
Book leverage indicates a countercyclical leverage ratio.  
 
From the regression output, we see that Recession is positively related to leverage ratio in the 
IT services industry. This positive relation, similar to Spread, indicates that the industry’s 
leverage ratio is countercyclical; therefore, more debt (or less equity) is used during periods of 
recession. By focusing on Market leverage as the dependent variable, we notice that the 
Recession coefficient indicates that, in periods of recession, the leverage ratio is around 1.2% 
higher than in periods without recession, all else being equal. The positive coefficients are 
significant at the 1% level for both measurements of leverage.  
5.2 Determining Causal Effect through 2SLS Estimation 
To determine whether the effect on leverage ratio stems from changes in equity or debt, we 
adopt a new model using ΔDebt and ΔEquity as our independent variables. To control for 
omitted variable bias, we utilize an instrumental variable approach, using 2SLS estimation to 
establish a causal relationship between R&D intensity and the changes in debt and equity. We 
do so by using implied R&D tax subsidy rates as an instrument for R&D intensity. This works 
as a natural experiment and originates from Wilson’s (2009) work, which used state R&D tax 
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credit in the US to find that R&D tax credit effectively increases R&D investments within the 
state.  
 
To gather data on implied R&D tax subsidy rates, we used data published by the OECD27. 
When we look at the incentives different countries use to promote R&D, many factors come 
into consideration. A few countries in our sample do not offer tax credit but instead offer 
incentives such as reduced tax rates or accelerated depreciation on R&D assets, among others. 
It is difficult to compare such tax relief across countries, as fiscal legislation is complex (Warda, 
2001). Therefore, it is incorrect to claim that countries that do not offer R&D tax credit do not 
incentivize firms to invest more in R&D. Of interest is the sum of incentives a country provides. 
Consequently, we extend Wilson’s (2009) idea to focus on R&D tax credit alone and include 
other R&D incentives as well. To do so, we utilize the B-index. 
 
The B-index is a measurement of the before-tax income a “representative” firm needs to break 
even on USD 1 of R&D expenditures (Warda, 2001). In general, the index is presented as an 
implied subsidy rate, by taking one minus the B-index. More generous provisions give a lower 
break-even point and thus a higher subsidy. The OECD (2013) defines the B-index as follows: 
 
B-index	= 1 -	# 
1 - $  ,                                (15) 
where $ is the corporate tax rate, and % is the combined net present value of credits and 
allowances which apply to R&D outlays. The more favourable a country’s tax treatment of 
R&D expenditures, the lower its B-index. Thus, in a country with full write-off of R&D 
expenditures and zero R&D tax incentives schemes, % will be equal to $, and the B-index will 
be one. When the B-index is one, the implied tax subsidy rates on R&D expenditures will be 
zero. We use the real R&D implied tax subsidy rate in our model, and we name the variable 
R&DSub. 
For R&D tax subsidy rates to function as an instrument, it should be correlated with the 
independent variable, and the covariance between the instrument and the error term should be 
equal to zero. The first condition can be verified through regression, which is why we include 
the first-stage regression in Table 5. The second condition is more difficult to prove, and we 
                                                
27Data retrieved from: https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=RDTAX  under the following tab: Implied 
tax subsidy rates on R&D expenditures. 
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can only argue that, on the basis of economic intuition, there is nothing to imply that our 
instrument is correlated with the dependent variables. However, R&DInt is moderately 
correlated with the R&DFirm, and including this variable in the 2SLS could cause biased 
results. We have therefore omitted R&DFirm from the models. 
 
To give a better understanding of the correlation between the instrumental variable and the 
independent and dependent variables, a Pearson correlation table is presented in Table 4. The 
correlation of R&DSub and R&DInt is merely at 0.193, which is somewhat lower than what we 
would expect. For firms having zero or negative implied tax subsidy, the average R&DInt is 
less than 7%, but for those receiving tax subsidy, the number is close to 8%. For R&DFirm, 
observations with at least some R&D expenditures rises from approximately 70% to 72%. 
R&DSub show almost no correlation with the dependent variables.  
 
Table 4 
Pairwise Correlation Coefficients of the Instrument with the Independent and 
Dependent Variables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel A in Table 5 provides the results from the OLS, while Panel B provides the results from 
the 2SLS instrumental variable regression. The panels are repeated twice, as the models are 
completed with and without fixed effects. All control variables are included in each of the 
regressions, but they are not explicitly shown. We begin by discussing the results regarding 
R&DInt. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
  R&DSub 
Independent variable:   
R&DInt  0.193 
Dependent variables:   
ΔDebt  -0.032 
ΔEquity  0.024 
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Table 5 
2SLS Estimation of the Effect of R&D Intensity on Changes in Debt and Equity 
The table shows the two-stage least squares (2SLS) coefficients for the effect of R&D intensity on changes in debt and equity. The total sample 
consists of 7127 firm-year observations and 808 firms in the period of 2006-2018. Panel A present the standard OLS regressions while Panel B 
display the 2SLS. For Panel B, column (3) and (8) show the first-stage regression while (4), (5), (9) and (10) show the second-stage. Standard 
errors clustered at firm level are given in parenthesis. Firm FE and Year FE effects indicate whether calendar year and firm fixed effects are 
included in the specification. Control variables from the leverage ratio regression in Table 3 are included in all models. The symbols *, **, and *** 
denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
 
 Panel A: Panel data regression Panel B: IV – 2SLS Panel A: Panel data regression Panel B: IV – 2SLS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Dep. Var: ΔDebt ΔEquity R&DInt ΔDebt ΔEquity ΔDebt ΔEquity R&DInt ΔDebt ΔEquity 
Regression stage   First stage Second stage Second stage   First stage Second stage Second stage 
           
R&DInt -0.066** 0.157**    -0.012 0.100    
 (0.027) (0.073)    (0.037) (0.081)    
           
R&DInt    -0.170*** 0.295***    -0.024 0.156 
    (0.051) (0.089)    (0.053) (0.130) 
           
R&DSub   0.069**     0.041*   
   (0.029)     (0.022)   
           
Intangibility 0.168*** 0.123** 0.155*** 0.254*** 0.211*** 0.109 0.047 0.025 0.132 0.056 
 (0.052) (0.061) (0.031) (0.085) (0.068) (0.088) (0.056) (0.037) (0.103) (0.072) 
           
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 5624 5524 6413 5624 5524 5624 5524 6413 5624 5524 
adj. R2 0.041 0.055  0.023 0.029 0.217 0.286  0.189 0.223 
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A. The Effect of R&D Intensity on Changes in Debt and Equity (H1) 
In Panel A, R&DInt is negative and significant for ΔDebt and positive and significant for 
ΔEquity. The magnitude is largest for ΔEquity, where a one percentage point increase in 
R&DInt leads to an average of 0.157 percentage point increase in the amount of issued equity, 
all else being equal. This seems to be relatively large and economically significant effect, given 
that we found the coefficient on Tangibility on the effect on leverage ratio from Column (4) in 
Table 3 to be 0.336 (0.192). By using implied R&D tax subsidy rates as an instrument for R&D 
intensity, we find that the panel data regression underestimates the effect of R&DInt on ΔDebt 
and ΔEquity. Also, the coefficients of the predicted values of R&DInt retain their significance 
when 2SLS estimation is used before controlling for fixed effects. In the first-stage regressions, 
the instrument is positively significant to R&DInt; however, only at the 10% level when 
controlling for fixed effects.  
 
As R&D activities have been found to produce greater informational asymmetries than tangible 
assets, resulting in lower levels of debt (Aghion, et al. 2004), firms should generally rely on 
equity financing rather than on debt financing to fund R&D. Our negative coefficients on debt 
and positive coefficients on equity supports this. However, it is contrary to what we predicted 
in hypothesis 1. The reason for this may be that equity investors are eager to support IT services 
firms with high R&D investments, as R&D has been shown to produce substantial growth 
opportunities. This is consistent with the agency theory, according to which firms with growth 
options wield less leverage due to asset substitution problems (Lee & Lee, 2019). It may also 
be argued that IT services firms, which have a relatively large share of R&D expenditures, are 
likely to produce a significant amount of specific assets which creditors are sceptical to accept 
as collateral (Bah & Dumontier, 2001). Consequently, it seems that IT services firms with 
higher R&D intensity issue more equity and less debt, which decreases their overall leverage 
ratio.  
 
When fixed effects are included, none of the coefficients remain significant and their economic 
significance is reduced; however, their directions remain consistent. This leads us to believe 
that there is a lack of causality between R&D intensity and the effect on capital structure for IT 
services firms, and that the significant effects from OLS are due to correlation and not to 
causation.  
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An explanation for the insignificant relationship may be that firms are less liable when 
financing projects with external funds. Consequently, they are willing to take on greater risk at 
the expense of external investors, thereby creating a problem of moral hazard. The problem 
might be greater for firms with high R&D investments, as R&D is difficult to collateralize. As 
a result, R&D intensity imposes little effect on debt and equity issuance and the overall capital 
structure.  
B. The Effect of Intangible Assets on Changes in Debt and Equity (H2) 
For Intangibility, the coefficients are significant and positive for both ΔDebt and ΔEquity before 
controlling for fixed effects. The magnitude of the coefficients is greater for ΔDebt  and smaller 
for ΔEquity, compared to the R&DInt coefficients. From Panel A, a one percentage point 
increase in Intangibility will increase the average change in debt by 0.168 percentage points, if 
all else is held constant. As was argued with the R&DInt coefficients, this magnitude seems 
more than sizeable enough to indicate economic significance. Comparing these results with the 
leverage ratio regression in Table 3, we find our results to be coherent regarding the effect on 
leverage. Intangible assets positively affect both debt and equity, but its effect on debt must be 
dominating as the overall effect on the leverage ratio is positive. The dominating effect of debt 
is supported by the magnitude of the coefficients, as they are larger for ΔDebt than ΔEquity. 
 
The positive relationship between intangible assets and change in debt is likely to arise, as our 
intangible assets are identifiable, may be collateralizable and may therefore support debt as 
tangible assets do (Lim et al., 2019). It can also be explained with reference to the low level of 
tangibility, as firms with sufficient tangible assets will support all the debt they require, thus 
making it unnecessary for intangible assets to back debt. Furthermore, from the perspective of 
the pecking order theory, firms with few tangible assets, such as IT services firms, are more 
sensitive to information asymmetries. These firms will thus issue debt rather than equity when 
they are in need of external funds (Harris & Raviv, 1991). As more intangible assets seem to 
indicate that IT services firms issue both more debt and equity, but in a greater magnitude for 
debt, our results from the OLS without fixed effects are consistent with the pecking order 
theory. 
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However, when accounting for fixed effects, we experience the same loss of significance and 
magnitude for the Intangibility coefficients as with the R&DInt coefficients. Though we do not 
use an instrument for intangible assets, the results provide no indications that intangibility 
affects either the issuance of debt or equity on a within-firm level. We find it peculiar that none 
of the examined variables seem to show a significant relationship with either leverage ratio or 
changes in equity and/or debt when controlling for fixed effects. This is especially true of 
intangibility, as we hypothesized that it has at least some impact on the capital structure of IT 
services firms. 
5.3 Robustness 
We test the robustness of our results in three different ways. First, we repeat our regression 
analysis in Table 3 by using different definitions of leverage, following Rajan and Zingales 
(1995). Thereafter, we estimate the leverage ratio regressions using lagged values of the 
independent variables. Lastly, we examine our findings for biases that might arise from 
differences in the institutional regimes. 
 
Column (4) in Table 3 has been revised with alternative measures of leverage to determine 
whether our previous results depend on how leverage is defined. We choose the model in 
Column (4) as it accounts for firm and year-fixed effects, thus reducing the omitted variable 
bias. The different measurements for leverage are presented in Table A1, and the results from 
the regressions in Table A4. The regressions support the conclusion that tangibility, size, and 
profitability are the most reliant drivers of corporate leverage in the IT services industry. For 
the remaining variables, the coefficients show the same signs as in Table 3; however, the 
significance levels do vary in some instances.  
 
The leverage ratio regressions in which the explanatory variables are lagged by one period are 
presented in Table A5. To some extent, we mitigate the concern for reverse causality and 
simultaneity bias by lagging the independent variables. The results for the OLS models and 
fixed effect models remain unchanged with the different specification.  
 
Lastly, following Drobetz et al. (2013), we examine our regression output for biases that might 
exist due to differences in institutional regimes between countries. Accessibility to external 
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finance is determined by a country’s legal origin (LaPorta et al., 1998). It is commonly accepted 
that capital markets in countries with common law supply superior opportunities to manage 
their capital structure (Halling et al., 2012; Drobetz et al., 2013). According to Fan et al. (2012), 
the legal regime explains a substantial part of the cross-sectional variance in corporate leverage, 
where systems, with common law being associated with lower leverage ratios than countries 
with civil law systems. To test the robustness of our firm-specific determinants of leverage 
across countries, we add cross-product terms between our variables and a dummy variable 
indicating law regime. The results are documented in Table A6. 
 
Overall, the coefficients on the non-cross terms remain mainly unchanged. There is, however, 
some evidence for an increased influence of dividend payout ratio and profitability on leverage 
in countries with common law systems. Besides these two variables, the cross-product terms 
are largely insignificant. We conclude that our dependent variables are mainly independent of 
institutional characteristics, which indicates that IT services firms are mostly independent of 
country-level influences. To summarize, our results are robust across the three different 
robustness tests. 
 
6. Conclusion 
6.1 Summary and Conclusion 
The aim of this study has been to analyse which factors affect the capital structure of globally 
listed IT services firms with a focus on the effect of R&D intensity and intangible assets. 
Therefore, this study’s research question is as follows: 
 
 Can R&D intensity and intangible assets help explain capital structure for IT services firms? 
 
To answer this question, we first provided a literature review on capital structure, and utilized 
this to develop our hypotheses and variables. Next, we ran regressions with these variables on 
leverage ratio and changes in debt and equity. 
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The intuition behind hypothesis 1 is that innovative firms with high R&D intensity have a higher 
degree of asymmetric information between insiders and outsiders. Thus, signalling can lead to 
the undervaluation of new shares, thereby making equity issuances less preferable than debt 
issuances. Secondly, the relationship between R&D intensity and leverage is positive for 
biotechnology firms which have industry traits similar to those of IT services.  
Since intangible assets can help generate cash flow, and because any valuable asset should at 
least contribute somewhat to increase a firm’s debt capacity, we expect intangible assets to have 
a positive effect on debt. This is the main reasoning behind hypothesis 2. 
 
To answer the research question and hypothesis, we have developed measurements for debt- 
and market leverage ratios and measurements for debt and equity issuance. Also, we have 
included implied R&D tax subsidy as an instrumental variable in an attempt to establish a causal 
relationship between R&D intensity and the issuance of debt and equity. Before we investigate 
whether the effects on capital structure are driven from changes in equity or debt, we first run 
regressions on leverage ratios to establish which determinants affect capital structure. 
 
From the empirical sections of this thesis, we derive the following conclusions. Standard 
determinants of capital structure show traits similar to those of previous empirical work. 
Judging from the macroeconomic factors alone, recession seems to be a reliant determinant of 
the overall leverage ratio of IT services firms. However, the inclusion of the macroeconomic 
variables does not explain much of the variance in leverage ratio. Regarding hypothesis 1, we 
find that, before the inclusion of firm-fixed effects, a significantly negative relationship exists 
between R&D intensity and leverage. However, the negative effect becomes insignificant when 
firm-fixed effects are included. By accounting for firm-fixed effects, the explanatory power of 
the models increases considerably. This makes many of the variables, such as R&DInt, lose 
their significant effect, implying that the capital structure of IT services firms to a large extent 
is driven by an unobserved time-invariant component. Because we are not able to establish a 
causal relationship between R&D intensity and debt for IT services firms, we reject hypothesis 
1. In fact, R&D intensity seem to have a negative relationship with both leverage ratio and debt. 
We confirm that IT services firms do not have the same positive relationship between R&D 
intensity and leverage as biotechnology firms. Across all models in the leverage ratio 
regression, we observe a positive relationship between intangible assets and leverage. The 
magnitude of the coefficients is somewhat smaller than those of tangible assets, thereby 
indicating that intangible assets do not support debt as much as tangible assets for IT services 
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firms. Nevertheless, we reject hypothesis 2, as the observed positive effect of tangible assets on 
leverage is not significant to the inclusion of firm-fixed effects. In conclusion, intangible assets 
and R&D intensity are not reliable determinants of capital structure for IT services firms.  
6.2 Limitations 
This study has three key limitation, the first of which is related to the data collection and its 
reliability. Gathering the data was a time-demanding process, and the amount of data was too 
large for us to manually assure its accuracy. However, we retrieved the data from acknowledged 
sources in an attempt to minimize inaccuracies. Furthermore, for a very small section of our 
sample, we manually checked companies’ financial reports, and we observed that most of the 
data aligned. Nevertheless, we found that numbers from a company’s financial statement 
diverged from the collected data in a few instances. Though we cannot document the magnitude 
of these inaccuracies, they may have affected our data to some extent.  
  
Secondly, there is a limitation related to the classification of firms. Firms were included based 
on SIC codes associated with the IT services industry. Thus, errors in our data may have arisen 
if a firm changed its main business between 2006 and 2018. In addition, we found companies 
that were defined within the SIC codes but whose main business activity clearly deviated from 
IT services. For example, firms operating within mining and shipping were present in our 
sample. Consequently, there is a possibility that our dataset contains some firms which are 
clearly not within the IT services sector. It is also possible that our dataset is missing firms that 
actually operate within the IT services sector. 
  
Lastly, as mentioned in Chapter 4, different accounting standards exists across countries. These 
differences are not considered in this study. By gathering all the financial numbers from one 
database, we mitigate some inaccuracies that might arise. Due to the different accounting 
standards implemented in different countries, it is not unlikely that our results are affected to 
some extent. 
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6.3 Further Research 
Keeping our limitations in mind, we note that a natural starting point for further research would 
be an improvement of the inaccuracies mentioned above. Furthermore, our data consists solely 
of listed firms which are predominantly large and mature. To obtain a deeper understanding of 
the capital structure of companies and the effect of R&D intensity and intangibility, adding 
non-listed firms to the sample would contribute with valuable information. It would be 
reasonable to assume that these firms are affected in a different manner, and an analysis of such 
companies would provide additional insight into the topic.  
  
Because this study has used data from 26 countries, an interesting approach would be to go 
deeper into cross-country differences. In our study, we distinguished between countries with 
common or civil law as a robustness test. However, cultural and institutional differences are 
likely to affect a firm’s capital structure beyond what is explained by a country’s legal system. 
Therefore, it would be interesting to determine how these dissimilarities influence the effects 
of the variables on the overall capital structure.  
  
Another approach for further research would be to incorporate aspects of behavioural corporate 
finance. Managerial traits and discretionary judgment are likely to have some impact on a firm’s 
R&D expenditures. Are there differences between female and male managers willingness to 
invest in R&D? And what if the managers are innovators themselves (e.g., Elon Musk)? By 
capturing these traits, it would be interesting to investigate to what extent such managerial 
characteristics effect R&D intensity and capital structure. The possibilities for further research 
on this topic are many. We hope this study contributes to and encourages further research in 
the field of capital structure. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
46	
	
7. References 
Aghion, P., Bond, S., Klemm, A., & Marinescu, I. (2004). Technology and Financial 
Structure: Are Innovative Firms Different? Journal of the European Economic 
Association, 2(2-3), 277-288. 
Al-Ajmi, J., Hussain, H., & Al-Saleh, N. (2009). Decisions on capital structure in a Zakat 
environment with prohibition of Riba. Journal of Risk Finance, 10(5), 460-476. 
Andrade, G., & Kaplan, S. N. (1998). How Costly Is Financial (Not Economic) Distress? 
Evidence from Highly Leveraged Transactions That Became Distressed. The Journal 
of Finance, 53(5), 1443-1493. 
Antoniou, A., Guney, Y., & Paudyal, K. (2008). The Determinants of Capital Structure: 
Capital Market Oriented Versus Bank Oriented Institutions. Journal of Financial and 
Quantitative Analysis, 43(1), 59-92. 
Ater, D. K. (2017). Market Timing and Capital Structure: A Critical Literature Review. 
Research Journal of Finance and Accounting, 8(6), 81-94. 
Bah, R., & Dumontier, P. (2001). R&D Intensity and Corporate Financial Policy: Some 
International Evidence. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 28(5), 671-692. 
Baker, M., & Wurgler, J. (2002). Market Timing and Capital Structure. The Journal of 
Finance, 57(1). 
Balakrishnan, S., & Fox, I. (1993). Asset specificity, firm heterogeneity and capital structure. 
Strategic Management Journal, 14(1), 3-16. 
Barclay, M. J., Smith, C. W., & Erwan, M. (2006). On the Debt Capacity of Growth Options. 
The Journal of Business, 79(1), 37-60. 
Baxter, N. D. (1967). Leverage, Risk of Ruin and the Cost of Capital. The Journal of Finance, 
22(3), 395-403. 
Berk, J., & DeMarzo, P. (2014). Corporate Fianance (Third Edition ed.). Boston: Pearson 
Education, Inc. 
Berk, J., & DeMarzo, P. (2017). Corporate Fiance, 4th edition. Essex, England: Pearson 
Education Limited. 
Berk, J., & Peter, D. (2016). Corporate Finance (4th ed.). Pearson Education Limited. 
Bessler, W., Drobetz, W., Haller, R. H., & Meier, I. (2013). The international zero-leverage 
phenomenon. Journal of Corporate Finance, 23, 196-221. 
47	
	
Byoun, S. (2008, Desember). How and When Do Firms Adjust Their CapitalStructures 
toward Targets? The Journal of Finance, 3069-3096. 
Canarella, G., & Miller, S. M. (2019, April). Determinants of Optimal Capital Structure and 
Speed of Adjustment: Evidence From the U.S. ICT Sector. Retrieved from Social 
Science Research Network: 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3354975 
Chakraborty, I. (2010). Capital structure in an emerging stock market-case of India. Research 
in International Business and Finance, 24(3), 295-314. 
Dahlquist, M., & Harvey, C. R. (2001). Global Tactical Asset Allocation. Social Science 
Research Network. 
Demmou, L., Stefanescu, I., & Arquié, A. (2019, May). OECD. Retrieved from 
http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=ECO/WKP(
2019)16&docLanguage=En 
Donaldson, G. (1961). Corporate Debt Capacity: A Study of Corporate Debt Policy and the 
Determination of Corporate Debt Capacity. Boston: Harvard University, Graduate 
School of Business Administration, Division of Research. 
Drobetz, W., Gounopoulos, D., Merikas, A., & Schröder, H. (2013). Capital structure 
decisions of globally-listed shippingcompanies. Transportation Research Part E: 
Logistics and Transportation Review., 52, 49-76. 
Empel, v. B. (2012, Desember). arno. Retrieved from http://arno.uvt.nl/show.cgi?fid=128277 
Forrest, C. (2016, March). Techrepublic. Retrieved from 
https://www.techrepublic.com/article/tech-industry-employment-soars-past-6-7-
million-led-by-it-services/ 
Frank, M. Z., & Goyal, V. K. (2009). Capital structure decisions: which factors are reliably 
important? Financial Management, 38(1), 1-37. 
Frank, M. Z., & K., G. V. (2005). Tradeoff and Pecking Order Theories of Debt. Handbook of 
Empirical Corporate Finance, 2, 135-202. 
Fred Economic Data. (2019). (F. r. Louis, Producer) Retrieved from 
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/T10Y3M 
Gartner. (2019). Gartner. Retrieved from Gartner Glossary: 
https://www.gartner.com/en/information-technology/glossary/it-services 
Goedhart, M. H., Koller, T., & Rehm, W. (2006). mckinsey. Retrieved from 
https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/strategy-and-corporate-finance/our-
insights/making-capital-structure-support-strategy 
48	
	
Grandviewresearch. (2019). IT Professional Services Market Size Worth $1.07 Trillion By 
2025. San Francisco: Grandviewresearch. 
Hall, G. C., Michaelas, N., & Hutchinson, P. J. (2004). Determinants of the Capital Structure 
of European SMEs. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 31, 711-728. 
Halling, M., Yu, J., & Zechner, J. (2012). Leverage Dynamics over the Business Cycle. 
4nations.org. Retrieved from https://www.4nations.org/papers/hallingyuzechner13.pdf 
Harris, A., & Raviv, M. (1991). The Theory of Capital Structure. Journal of the American 
Finance Association, 297-355. 
Harvin, H., Gaffner, A., Vialle, G., & Felix, I. (2014). IT SERVICES Winning in the next 
decade: From industrialized to agile. Retrieved from 
https://www.oliverwyman.com/content/dam/oliver-
wyman/global/en/2015/sep/Oliver%20Wyman%20-%20IT%20services.pdf 
Hochman, S., & Palmon, O. (1985). The Impact of Inflation on the Aggregate Debt-Asset 
Ratio. The Journal of Financa, 40(4), 1115-1125. 
IFRS. (2019). IFRS. Retrieved from https://www.ifrs.org/issued-standards/list-of-
standards/ias-38-intangible-assets/ 
Jensen, M. C. (1986). Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers. 
The American Economic Review, 76(2), 323-329. 
Kaur, R., & Rao, N. (2009). Determinants of capital structure: experience of Indian cotton 
textile industry. The XIMB Journal of Management, 6(2), 97-112. 
Kraus, A., & Litzenberger, R. H. (1973). A State-Preference Model of Optimal Financial 
Leverage. Journal of Finance, 28(4), 911-922. 
Kumar, S., Colombage, S., & Rao, P. (2017). Research on capital structure determinants: a 
review and future directions. International Journal of Managerial Finance, 13(2), 
106-132. 
La Porta, R., Lopez- de- Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. w. (1998). Law and Finance. 
Journal of Political Economy, 106(6), 1113-1155. 
Lee, N., & Lee, J. (2019). External Financing, R&D Intensity, and Firm Value in 
Biotechnology Companies. Sustainability, 1-18. 
Lemmon, M. L., & F. Zender, J. (2010). Debt Capacity and Tests of Capital Structure 
Theories. The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 45(5), 1161-1187. 
Lemmon, M. L., Roberts, M. R., & Zender, J. F. (2008). Back to the Beginning: Persistence 
and theCross-Section of Corporate Capital Structure. The Journal of Finance, 63(4), 
1575-1608. 
49	
	
Lim, S. C., Macias, A. J., & Moeller, T. (2019). Intangible Assets and Capital Structure. 
Retrieved from https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2514551 
Long, M. S., & Malitz, I. B. (1985). Investment Patterns and Financial Leverage. National 
Bureau of Economic Research, 325 - 352. 
Majluf, N. S., & Myers, S. C. (1984). Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When 
Firms Have Information That Investors Do Not Have. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 13(2), 187-221. 
Modigliani, F., & Miller, M. H. (1958). The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the 
Theory of Investment. The American Economic Review, 48(3), 261-297. 
Myers, S. C. (1977). DETERMINANTS OF CORPORATE BORROWING. Journal of 
Financial Economics , 5, 145-175. 
Myers, S. C. (2001). Capital Structure. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 15(2), 81-102. 
NBER. (2019). National Bereau of Economic Reserach. Retrieved from nber.org/cycles.html 
Nunkoo, P. K., & Boateng, A. (2010). The empirical determinants of target capital structure 
and adjustment to long-run target: evidence from Canadian firms. Applied Economics 
Letters, 17(10), 983-990. 
OECD. (2013). OECD. Retrieved from MEASURING R&D TAX INCENTIVES: 
https://www.oecd.org/sti/b-index.pdf 
OECD. (2019). OECD data. Retrieved from https://data.oecd.org/price/inflation-cpi.htm 
OECD. (2019). OECD.Stat. Retrieved from stats.oecd: 
https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=RDTAX 
Park, C. W., & Pincus, M. (1997). Internal versus external equity funding sources and 
earnings response coefficients. Iowa city: The University of Iowa. 
Pathak, J. (2010). What determines capital structure of listed firms in India? Some empirical 
evidence From Indian capital market. Retrieved from Social Science Research 
Network: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1561145 
Petersen, M. A. (2009). Estimating Standard Errors in Finance Panel Data Sets: Comparing 
Approaches. Review of Financial Studies, 22(1), 435-480. 
Rajan, R. G., & Zingales, L. (1995). What Do We Know about Capital Structure? Some 
Evidence from International Data. The Journal of Finance, 50, 1421-1460. 
Rampini, A. A., & Viswanathan, S. (2013). Collateral and capital structure. Journal of 
Financial Economics, 109(2), 466-492. 
50	
	
Richardson, H. (2019, March). Marketrealist. Retrieved from 
https://articles2.marketrealist.com/2015/03/relatively-low-leverage-gives-tech-
companies-flexibility/ 
SEC. (2019). U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. Retrieved from 
https://www.sec.gov/info/edgar/siccodes.htm 
Sheikh, N. A., & Wang, Z. (2011). Determinants of capital structure : an empirical study of 
firms in manufacturing industry of Pakistan. Managerial finance, 37, 117-133. 
Strebulaev, I. A., & Yang, B. (2013). The mystery of zero-leverage firms. Journal of 
Financial Economics, 109(1), 1-23. 
Stulz, R. M. (1996). RETHINKING RISK MANAGEMENT. Journal of Applied Corporate 
Finance, 9, 8-25. Retrieved from Stulz, R. M. (1996), RETHINKING RISK 
MANAGEMENT. Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 9: 8-25. doi:10.1111/j.1745-
6622.1996.tb00295.x 
Taggart, R. A. (1985). Secular Patterns in the Financing of U.S. Corporations. National 
Bureau of Economic Research, 13-80. 
Taylor, R. (1990). Interpretation of the Correlation Coefficient: A Basic Review. Journal of 
Diagnostic Medical Sonography, 35-39. 
Titman, S., & Wessels, R. (1988, March). The Determinants of Capital Structure Choice. The 
Journal of Finance, 1-19. 
Van Empel, B. (2012). The Effect of Recessions on the Capital Structure and Leverage 
Determinants. Tilburg School of Economics and Management, Finance . Tilburg: 
Tilburg University. 
Warda, J. (2001). Measuring the Value of R&D Tax Treatment in OECD Countries. STI 
Review No.27: Special Issue on New Science and Technology Indicators, OECD 
Publishing, 1-207. 
Warner, J. B. (1977). Bankruptcy Costs: Some Evidence. The Journal of Finance, 32(2), 337-
347. 
Wilner, B. S. (2000). The Exploitation of Relationships in Financial Distress: The Case of 
Trade Credit . The Journal of Finance, 55(1), 153-178. 
Wilson, D. J. (2009). Beggar thy Neighbor? The In-State, Out-of-State, and Aggregate Effects 
of R&D Tax Credits. Review of Economics and Statistics, 91(2), 431-436. 
World Trademark Review. (2018). worldtrademarkreview. Retrieved from 
https://www.worldtrademarkreview.com/brand-management/amazon-overtakes-
microsoft-top-intangible-value-ranking-research-calls 
51	
	
8. Appendix 
Table A1 
Variable Construction 
 
 
Variable Variable Construction 
Company-specific variables  
Book leverage (Long term debt + Debt in current liabilities)/(Total assets) 
Market leverage (Long term debt + Debt in current liabilities)/(Total assets 
- Ordinary equity + Market value of equity) 
ΔDebt (Long term debtt+1 + Debt in current liabilitiest+1)/(Long 
term debtt + Debt in current liabilitiest) – 1  
ΔEquity (Common sharest+1)/(Common sharest) – 1 (adj. for stock 
split using Compustat variable SPLIT) 
Tangibility Tangible assets/Total assets 
Intangibility (Intangible assets – Goodwill)/Total assets 
Profit Operating income before depreciation/Total assets 
M/B (Total assets - Ordinary equity + Market value of 
equity)/Total assets 
LNSize Ln(Total assets) 
R&DFirm 1 if R&D expenses is greater than 0, else 0 
R&DInt R&D expenses/Total sales 
Dividend Dividends paid/Net income 
Macroeconomic factors  
Recession 1 if recession, else 0 
MSCI Annual stock market return of the MSCI World Index 
Spread 10-Year treasury constant maturity minus 3-month treasury 
constant maturity 
Inflation Annual yearly growth rate in OECD. 
Alternative measurements of leverage ratio and Law (robustness) 
Book leverage 2 (Total assets – Ordinary equity)/Total assets 
Book leverage 3 (Long term debt + Debt in current liabilities)/(Ordinary 
equity + Long term debt + Debt in current liabilities) 
Market leverage 2 (Total assets – Ordinary equity)/(Total assets – Ordinary 
equity + Market value of equity) 
Market leverage 3 (Long term debt + Debt in current liabilities)/ (Market 
value of equity + Long term debt + Debt in current 
liabilities) 
Law 1 if country has common law regime, else 0 
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	 Table A2 
Data Description 
Data Source Description 
Company-specific data   
Total assets Compustat Total assets and liabilities of a company at a point in time.  
Common shares Compustat Number of common/ordinary shares outstanding as of the company's fiscal year-end. 
For ΔEquity common shares are adjusted for stock splits and reverse stock splits. 
Ordinary equity Compustat Common stock outstanding, capital surplus, retained earnings, and adjustments for 
treasury stocks. 
Debt in current liabilities Compustat This item represents the total amount of short-term notes and the current portion of 
long-term debt due in 1 year. 
Long term debt Compustat Debt obligations due more than one year from the company’s balance sheet date. 
Total short time debt Compustat This item represents liabilities due within one year, including the current portion of long-
term debt. 
Operating income before depreciation Compustat Sales revenue less operating expenses. 
Tangible assets Compustat Property, plant and equipment. 
Intangible assets Compustat Copyrights, design costs, goodwill, licenses, patents, trademarks and tradename, 
software, operating rights etc. 
Goodwill Compustat The excess cost over equity of an acquired company. 
Market value of equity Bloomberg The market value of equity at the end of the financial year. 
Dividend Bloomberg Dividend paid that financial year. 
Macroeconomic data   
Recession Datastream NBER classifies recession as a significant decline in economic activity spread across the 
economy, lasting more than a few months. 
R&D tax credit OECD Implied R&D tax subsidy rates for a given country in a specific year. 
MSCI World Index MSCI The MSCI World Index is a broad global equity index that represents large and mid-cap 
equity performance across all 23 developed markets countries. 
Spread Federal reserve 10-Year treasury constant maturity minus 3-month treasury constant maturity. 
Inflation OECD Annual yearly growth rate in OECD. 
Exchange rates Datastream  
Law regime World Factbook 
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Table A3 
Company Statistics 
Number of companies, percentage of total observations, law system and highest recorded 
implied R&D tax subsidy rate during the period of 2006 to 2018. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Country Companies % Law system R&D tax subsidy 
Japan 158 18.49% Civil 17% 
USA 122 15.07% Common 6% 
China 98 11.52% Civil 15% 
UK 85 10.18% Common 11% 
South Korea 81 9.79% Civil 11% 
France 72 8.97% Civil 45% 
Sweden 34 4.32% Civil 5% 
Germany 23 3.23% Civil -2% 
Australia 20 2.88% Common 12% 
Canada 18 2.69% Common 18% 
Norway 13 1.92% Civil 22% 
Finland 11 1.57% Civil 28% 
Poland 9 1.20% Civil 22% 
South Africa 9 1.15% Common 17% 
Italy 9 1.22% Civil 12% 
Switzerland 7 0.98% Civil -1% 
Israel 7 0.95% Civil 0% 
The Netherlands 7 0.94% Civil 15% 
Denmark 6 0.76% Civil 0% 
Greece 6 0.63% Civil 11% 
Austria 4 0.44% Civil 17% 
Belgium 3 0.44% Civil 16% 
Portugal 2 0.36% Civil 41% 
Ireland 2 0.17% Common 29% 
Russia 1 0.07% Civil 11% 
Spain 1 0.05% Civil 45% 
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Table A4 
Panel Data Regression Using Alternative Measures on Leverage 
The table shows the results of the leverage regressions using a sample of 808 listed IT services firms during the period from 
2006 to 2018, with alternative measures of leverage. Definitions of leverage are provided in table A1. Standard errors 
clustered at firm level are given in parenthesis. Firm FE and Year FE effects indicate whether firm and calendar year fixed 
effects are included in the specification. The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dep.Var: Book (2) Book (3) Market (2) Market (3) 
     
R&DInt -0.138* -0.052 -0.090* -0.063 
 (0.072) (0.076) (0.048) (0.047) 
R&DFirm 0.018* 0.009 0.016* 0.005 
 (0.010) (0.012) (0.010) (0.012) 
Intangibility 0.017 0.033 0.043 0.019 
 (0.077) (0.076) (0.054) (0.052) 
Tangibility 0.302*** 0.405*** 0.181*** 0.218*** 
 (0.090) (0.108) (0.061) (0.069) 
M/B 0.011** 0.002 -0.095*** -0.042*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) 
Profit -0.330*** -0.381*** -0.288*** -0.242*** 
 (0.050) (0.058) (0.038) (0.042) 
LNSize 0.017 0.040*** 0.037*** 0.053*** 
 (0.013) (0.015) (0.009) (0.010) 
Dividend -0.006 -0.006 -0.010** -0.009** 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes yes Yes 
N 6413 6413 6413 6413 
adj. R2 0.743 0.668 0.803 0.686 
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Table A5 
Panel Data Regression Using Lagged Independent Variables 
The table shows the results of the leverage regressions using a sample of 808 listed IT services firms during the period from 
2006 to 2018, where all independent variables are lagged by one period. Standard errors clustered at firm level are given in 
parenthesis. Firm FE and Year FE effects indicate whether firm and calendar year fixed effects are included in the specification. 
The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Dep.Var: Book leveraget    
 R&DIntt-1 -0.139*** -0.018 -0.136*** -0.013 
  (0.041) (0.048) (0.042) (0.048) 
 R&DFirmt-1 -0.023** -0.002 -0.024** 0.002 
  (0.010) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008) 
 Intangibilityt-1 0.219*** 0.035 0.219*** 0.039 
  (0.044) (0.048) (0.044) (0.049) 
 Tangbilityt-1 0.248*** 0.249*** 0.252*** 0.241*** 
  (0.061) (0.072) (0.061) (0.071) 
 M/Bt-1 -0.010*** 0.002 -0.011*** 0.002 
  (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
 Profitt-1 -0.167*** -0.134*** -0.161*** -0.134*** 
  (0.037) (0.041) (0.037) (0.042) 
 LNSizet-1 0.016*** 0.026*** 0.016*** 0.029*** 
  (0.003) (0.008) (0.003) (0.009) 
 Dividendt-1 -0.035*** -0.001 -0.035*** -0.000 
  (0.007) (0.003) (0.007) (0.003) 
 Year FE No No Yes Yes 
 Firm FE No Yes No Yes 
 N 5542 5542 5542 5542 
 adj. R2 0.115 0.690 0.117 0.693 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Dep.Var: Market leveraget    
 R&DIntt-1 -0.106*** -0.030 -0.105*** -0.015 
  (0.031) (0.032) (0.031) (0.032) 
 R&DFirmt-1 -0.020** -0.009 -0.019** -0.002 
  (0.008) (0.007) (0.009) (0.007) 
 Intangibilityt-1 0.159*** 0.027 0.160*** 0.034 
  (0.034) (0.038) (0.034) (0.039) 
 Tangbilityt-1 0.211*** 0.118*** 0.214*** 0.096** 
  (0.050) (0.043) (0.050) (0.041) 
 M/Bt-1 -0.030*** -0.011*** -0.031*** -0.008*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
 Profitt-1 -0.107*** -0.084*** -0.105*** -0.090*** 
  (0.024) (0.029) (0.024) (0.029) 
 LNSizet-1 0.009*** 0.030*** 0.009*** 0.039*** 
  (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.007) 
 Dividendt-1 -0.029*** -0.002 -0.028*** 0.000 
  (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) 
 Year FE No No Yes Yes 
 Firm FE No Yes No Yes 
 N 5523 5523 5523 5523 
 adj. R2 0.186 0.710 0.196 0.727 
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Table A6 
Panel Data Regression Controlling for Law Regime 
The table shows the results of the leverage ratio regressions using a sample of 808 listed IT services firms during the period from 2006 to 2018, In addition, the cross-products terms with the 
explanatory variables and country law regime dummy is included. The variable Law is set equal to one for countries with common law regime and zero otherwise. Standard errors clustered at firm 
level are given in parenthesis. Firm FE and Year FE effects indicate whether firm and calendar year fixed effects are included in the specification. The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 Dep.Var: Book leverage  Dep.Var: Market leverage 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
        
R&DInt -0.159*** -0.005 -0.160*** -0.004 -0.113*** -0.041 -0.116*** -0.038 
 (0.043) (0.044) (0.043) (0.044) (0.031) (0.029) (0.032) (0.030) 
R&DFirm -0.016 -0.005 -0.016 -0.001 -0.015* -0.003 -0.014 0.002 
 (0.010) (0.008) (0.011) (0.008) (0.009) (0.007) (0.009) (0.007) 
Intangibility 0.257*** 0.009 0.257*** 0.014 0.164*** -0.005 0.165*** 0.002 
 (0.055) (0.050) (0.055) (0.051) (0.040) (0.039) (0.040) (0.039) 
Tangibility 0.292*** 0.349*** 0.294*** 0.342*** 0.230*** 0.210*** 0.231*** 0.199*** 
 (0.063) (0.072) (0.063) (0.071) (0.050) (0.045) (0.050) (0.044) 
M/B -0.011*** -0.004 -0.011*** -0.001 -0.035*** -0.026*** -0.034*** -0.020*** 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
Profit -0.246*** -0.241*** -0.243*** -0.244*** -0.156*** -0.156*** -0.156*** -0.164*** 
 (0.039) (0.043) (0.040) (0.044) (0.026) (0.031) (0.026) (0.031) 
LNSize 0.013*** 0.029*** 0.013*** 0.031*** 0.008*** 0.029*** 0.008*** 0.035*** 
 (0.003) (0.010) (0.003) (0.012) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.008) 
Dividend -0.040*** -0.009** -0.040*** -0.009** -0.033*** -0.008** -0.033*** -0.008** 
 (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) 
R&DInt * Law 0.036 -0.001 0.034 -0.002 0.082 0.063 0.080 0.072 
 (0.127) (0.165) (0.127) (0.163) (0.089) (0.102) (0.090) (0.102) 
R&DFirm * Law -0.022 0.007 -0.021 0.008 -0.004 0.011 -0.005 0.009 
 (0.028) (0.017) (0.028) (0.017) (0.022) (0.013) (0.023) (0.013) 
Intangibility * Law -0.186** 0.022 -0.185* 0.018 -0.070 0.028 -0.070 0.021 
 (0.094) (0.092) (0.095) (0.094) (0.071) (0.071) (0.071) (0.073) 
Tangibility * Law -0.289 -0.014 -0.287 -0.042 -0.092 -0.086 -0.096 -0.125 
 (0.235) (0.252) (0.235) (0.262) (0.206) (0.178) (0.208) (0.189) 
M/B * Law -0.019 0.059** -0.019 0.059** -0.031* -0.018 -0.030* -0.016 
 (0.023) (0.024) (0.023) (0.024) (0.017) (0.021) (0.018) (0.021) 
Profit * Law 0.249** 0.080 0.246** 0.071 0.208*** 0.091 0.202*** 0.072 
 (0.105) (0.073) (0.106) (0.074) (0.076) (0.064) (0.076) (0.065) 
LNSize * Law 0.011* 0.011 0.011* 0.014 0.006 -0.005 0.006 -0.003 
 (0.007) (0.016) (0.007) (0.016) (0.005) (0.011) (0.005) (0.011) 
Dividend * Law 0.013 0.040** 0.013 0.042** 0.007 0.021* 0.007 0.024* 
 (0.029) (0.016) (0.029) (0.017) (0.020) (0.012) (0.020) (0.013) 
Year FE No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Firm FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
N 6413 6413 6413 6413 6413 6413 6413 6413 
adj. R2 0.140 0.686 0.140 0.688 0.233 0.721 0.233 0.726 
